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ABSTRACT 
The removal of presidents from office in Latin America has generally occurred under 
delineated constitutional procedures since the military governments of the mid-twentieth 
century returned to their barracks. Many theories on presidential removal have been 
tested among numerous cases, yet none alone can explain the Honduran political crisis of 
2009 that led to the ouster of constitutionally elected President Manuel Zelaya. The 
situation harkened back to the days when military coups were prevalent as the armed 
forces, acting under the authority of a court order, arrested the president, and illegally 
expatriated him to Costa Rica. Honduran elites feared Zelaya’s shift to the new “radical” 
left in Latin America and his alleged desire for reelection through his proposal for a 
referendum calling for the election of a constituent assembly. Responding to this fear, the 
Congress and Supreme Court acted to remove the president while the military’s decision 
to expatriate Zelaya stemmed from a legacy of leftist hatred. This thesis tests several 
elements of presidential removal theories against the Zelaya incident and argues that not 
one theory on its own can thoroughly answer the question; rather, it is necessary to 
incorporate several elements of each theory while examining the actions of the military 
and the courts to arrive at the answer. From a comparative analysis of past presidents, it 
argues that Zelaya’s new ideology and desire for reelection ultimately were the needed 
factors to initiate his removal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning hours of June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya Rosales of 
Honduras was forcibly removed by the Honduran military from the presidential palace 
and sent to exile in Costa Rica. This removal occurred after the Honduran judiciary 
determined that Zelaya’s recent attempt to hold a referendum on a potential constituent 
assembly had been unconstitutional, issued an arrest warrant for the president, and 
ordered the military to detain him for trial. With the president out of office, and 
subsequently out of the country, the National Congress voted to accept an alleged letter 
of resignation from Zelaya, thus officially declaring him no longer the President of 
Honduras.1 An apparent coup had successfully materialized in the country as members 
from the military, the courts, and the legislature responded in an elitist and clientilistic 
manner to overthrow the president. The action of deposing the president sent shock 
waves throughout the region and the world. Military coups, or events that resemble them, 
were distant memories in most of Latin America, and especially Honduras, a country that 
had enjoyed 27 years of continuous democratic rule.2 Indeed, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán notes 
that there is a new period of “political instability” surging in Latin America, “one that 
represents a break from the past:”3 a past of authoritarianism in the form of military 
intervention. 
Yet since the transition to democracy from the authoritarian military regimes of 
the 1960s through the 1980s, presidents in many Latin American countries have not 
finished their constitutionally mandated terms in office. Scholars have determined that 
while executives have fallen, democracy has not; or as Kathryn Hochstetler puts it, 
                                                 
1 Peter J. Meyer, Honduran Political Crisis, June 2009–January 2010 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), 4.  
2 Ibid., Summary Page. In some Latin American countries, the military has participated in coup 
behavior since democratization across the region in the 1980s–90s; although, the coups have not resulted in 
military rule. In particular, Ecuadorian military officers joined with indigenous movement leaders to 
remove elected president Jamil Mahuad in January 2000, and in April 2002, a faction of the Venezuelan 
armed forces successfully replaced President Hugo Chávez with another civilian leader, before Chávez 
returned to power days later. 
3 Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–3. 
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“Presidents fail, democracy continues.”4 The reason that democracy has survived changes 
in executive leadership by means other than the ballot box is simple: Latin American 
democracies have delineated legal means by which a chief executive may not complete a 
mandated term in office. These methods include impeachment proceedings, resignation, 
or declarations of incapacity.5 Academics have discovered differing causal chains leading 
to these presidential removals; yet, their findings cannot properly explain why the 
military, courts, and congress in Honduras acted to remove the constitutionally elected 
president, where, notably, no institution has a constitutionally mandated function to 
prematurely end a president’s term. Furthermore, at the time of the crisis, the Honduran 
constitution provided no legal or procedural means to impeach a sitting president.6 This 
study seeks to answer one major question: What explains the removal of President 
Manuel Zelaya? Answering this question is of crucial import, as doing so can shed light 
on presidential crises and how to avoid them in the future.  
A. BACKGROUND ON THE HONDURAN CRISIS OF 2009: A 
REFERENDUM 
In March 2009, Zelaya issued a decree that “called on the National Statistics 
Institute (INE) to hold a popular referendum on June 28, 2009, to determine if the 
country should include a fourth ballot box during the general elections in November 
2009.”7 This fourth ballot box would have been for the referendum and located next to 
the other three ballot boxes designated for the election of the president, congress, and 
municipal offices.8 Initially, the referendum was deemed “illegal and unconstitutional” 
by a contingent of political players that included the “Liberal [Party] attorney-general, the 
TSE [Supreme Electoral Tribunal], the National Congress, and the Supreme Court of 
                                                 
4 Kathryn Hochstetler, “The Fates of Presidents in Post-Transition Latin America: From Democratic 
Breakdown to Impeachment to Presidential Breakdown,” Journal of Politics in Latin America 3, no. 1 
(2011): 138. 
5 All the sources citied within this proposal refer to one or more of these processes and are annotated 
throughout the paper in other footnotes. 
6 Norma C. Gutiérrez, Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues (Washington, DC: The Law Library of 
Congress, 2009), 1. 
7 Meyer, Honduran Political Crisis, 2.  
8 Ibid. 
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Justice.”9 As a result of the rulings, “in May 2009, Zelaya repealed the March decree and 
issued a new decree―not published until June 25, 2009—that made the referendum non-
binding and removed the reference to a new constitution.”10 The wording was revised to 
read “do you agree that in the general elections of 2009, a fourth ballot box should be 
installed in which the people decide on the convocation of a National Constituent 
Assembly?”11  
While Zelaya’s opponents hurled accusations of unconstitutionality and illegality 
at him, it does at least appear he might have had a legal case for initiating the poll: the 
Law of Citizen Participation.12 This law was the first legislative accomplishment of 
Zelaya’s term that “provided the mechanism for popular consultation on important 
issues.”13 Furthermore, “Zelaya also noted that the referendum did not propose specific 
constitutional changes, and any changes arising from an eventual assembly would take 
place after he left office.”14 These justifications, however, were not enough to stop 
Honduras from hurtling towards a crisis. 
Zelaya grew defiant in the face of his opposition and refused to obey the rulings 
of the Supreme Court that such a referendum was unconstitutional. As a result, the 
referendum “was interpreted by Zelaya’s opponents as a first step toward his continuing 
in power, which would be a violation of the constitution.”15 The articles prohibiting 
reelection are said in Honduras to be “carved in stone,” and are strictly prohibited from 
being reformed for any reason whatsoever.16 Regardless of the political and legal force 
                                                 
9 J. Mark Ruhl, “Honduras Unravels,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2010): 100. 
10 Meyer, Honduran Political Crisis, 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, “The 2009 Coup and the Struggle for Democracy in Honduras,” NACLA 
Report on the Americas 44, no. 1 (2011). 
14 Meyer, Honduran Political Crisis, 3. 
15 Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Ura, “From Strengthening Institutions to a Coup: 
Explaining the Ouster of President Zelaya as an Outcome of a Game of Institutional Emergence,” (Paper 
presented at the Coloquio Centroamericano, San José, Costa Rica, June 3–4, 2010), 13. 
16 Ismael Moreno, “Honduras: What’s Behind the Fourth Ballot Box,” Revista Envío, May 2009, 
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3999/.  
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stacked against him, Zelaya vowed to press on. Days before his removal, Zelaya ordered 
the military to execute the referendum but was met with resistance by the chief military 
commander, General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, who refused to obey the President. 
Zelaya fired the general, and subsequently, the other branch heads along with the 
Minister of Defense resigned in solidarity. Immediately, the Supreme Court reinstated 
Vásquez and ordered Zelaya’s arrest. Thus, in the early morning hours of June 28, 2009, 
Zelaya was deposed as president. Acting on a court order, the military arrested Zelaya, 
and then on their own volition, sent him into exile in Costa Rica. Later that morning, “in 
an emergency session at 9:30 a.m., Congress accepted a forged letter from Zelaya in 
which he resigned for supposed health reasons;” and, “at about 11 a.m., [National 
Congress President Roberto Micheletti] was proclaimed the nation’s constitutional 
president.”17 At the time, Micheletti was next in line in presidential succession. As 
political scientist and Honduran scholar J. Mark Ruhl writes, Honduras had thus 
unraveled.18 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Breakdowns to government in Latin America were typical during the period when 
militaries left the barracks and occupied presidential palaces across the region. Yet with 
the transition to democracy in the mid twentieth century, military rule and intervention in 
politics began to be a thing of the past. Arturo Valenzuela declares, “in what has been a 
sea of change since the Cold War, Latin American militaries no longer mix openly in 
politics.”19 Since the armed forces have returned to their posts, scholars are still 
interested in why so many presidents in Latin America still experience a breakdown to 
their term in office. The overarching positive element to this phenomenon is that “in no 
case, however, was the demise of the president followed by the establishment of an 
authoritarian regime.”20 Despite the resilience of democracy, governments still face 
                                                 
17 Fasquelle, “The 2009 Coup.” 
18 Ruhl, “Honduras Unravels.” 
19 Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin America Presidencies Interrupted,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 
(2004): 6. 
20 Pérez-Liñán, Presidential Impeachment, 176. 
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interruptions in the executive.21 Impeachment is the most recognizable form of 
presidential removal. Understanding the impeachment process is critically important to 
Latin America, where “newer and more fragile democracies” experience tension between 
the presidency and congress.22 Impeachment serves as a legal mechanism to 
constitutionally diffuse these conflicts instead of the temptation to revert back to the old 
ways of military coups that brought about democratic crisis in the region.23 Yet, as the 
case of Honduras demonstrates, impeachment was not a viable option. 
1. Executive—Legislative Relationships, Party Politics, and Presidential 
Scandals 
The study of presidential removal in Latin America has evolved from the 
discussion of impeachment by legislatures to the broader topic of presidential breakdown 
by other means that include, but is not limited to, resignations and declarations of 
incapacity. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif represent the most well known work on 
legislatures in Latin America in the edited volume Legislative Politics in Latin America. 
Although this literature has produced impressive findings regarding “executive-
legislative relations, the legislative structure, and the policy making process,”24 it mainly 
stems from and supports the widely accepted perception that Latin American legislatures 
are “reactive” relative to the “proactive” executives.25 In contrast, as this thesis focuses 
on a case in which the Honduran Congress played a key role in the removal of a 
president, clearly it must move beyond the research on legislatures.  
Authors Jody C. Baumgartner and Naoko Kada noted, “impeachment is the 
ultimate check on the power of a chief executive in a presidential system, and therefore a 
                                                 
21 Valenzuela, “Presidencies Interrupted.” 
22 Jody C. Baumgartner, “Introduction: Comparative Presidential Impeachment,” in Checking 
Executive Power: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jody C. Baumgartner and 
Naoko Kada (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Scott Morgenstern, “Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America,” in Legislative Politics in 
Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
444. 
25 Gary W. Cox and Scott Morgenstern, “Epilogue: Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and 
Proactive Presidents,” in Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif 
(West Nyack: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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fundamental democratic element.”26 Their edited volume Checking Executive Power: 
Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective focuses on the politics of 
presidential impeachments by referring to the process as primarily a political, rather than 
legal, proceeding.27 While not solely focused on Latin America, their work is the premier 
volume that illustrates “the sequential unfolding of how scholars have characterized the 
many recent presidents who did not complete their terms,” 28 and thus, serves as a solid 
theoretical starting point in search of answers to the Zelaya question. 
The book centers on executive-legislative relationships surrounding impeachment 
and notes that the process may not occur on the occasion of a chief executive breaking 
the law, but rather when the other branches, specifically the legislature, take the stance 
that impeachment is warranted based on five causal factors: the strength of the president 
in relation to the legislature, the constitutional process for legal impeachment, “the 
structure of party politics”—including, for example—the type of party system, “how 
institutionalized the party system is,” how strictly members vote on party lines, and the 
degree of closeness the president has with certain parties—how popular the president was 
prior to alleged misconduct, and other factors that include “the media environment, 
economic conditions, and international pressures.”29 The volume concludes that 
impeachment is highly driven by the legislature’s relationship to the president and the 
latter’s ability to from a “legislative shield” whereby the congress would choose to 
protect the president from such proceedings or let him or her take the fall to protect 
                                                 
26 Baumgartner, “Introduction,” 3. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Hochstetler, “The Fates of Presidents,” 126. 
29 Baumgartner, “Introduction,” 11, 7. The status of the economy in Honduras at the time of the 
removal does not appear to have been a causal factor in the Zelaya incident. Jose Antonio Cordero of the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research concluded in a November 2009 report titled “Honduras: Recent 
Economic Performance” that “during the Zelaya administration, the Honduran economy performed well.” 
Furthermore, he notes that “inflation was kept under control . . . the economy grew more than during the 
previous administrations, and the levels of international monetary reserves allowed the country to maintain 
a stable foreign exchange rate.” Jose Antonio Cordero, Honduras: Recent Economic Performance 
(Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2009), 21. 
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itself.30 Regarding these relations, Kada emphasizes the “importance of the voting 
threshold for impeachment, partisan competition, presidential patronage, and public 
opinion of the president” in leading to impeachment proceedings.”31 Kathryn Hochstetler 
notes, however, that the sum of the author’s findings “does not carry forward,” as only 
the elements of partisanship and public opinion seem to be relevant to more recent 
theories/cases.32  
While the Honduran constitution has no specified process for impeachment of the 
president, Baumgartner and Kada’s work is still relevant to the Zelaya case because it 
provides pieces of a framework by which it is possible to understand legislative actions to 
remove the Honduran executive. The two factors most relevant to the case at hand 
concern executive-legislative relations and party politics, which are tested against 
empirical evidence presented in Chapter II. Zelaya’s attempt at a referendum was 
believed by many in the governmental and broader political spheres in Honduras to be an 
attempt to remain in office or seek reelection that gave credence to Baumgartner and 
Kada’s overall statement that impeachments are a political process.33 The executive-
legislative relationship in Honduras was clearly tense at the time given that after the 
Supreme Court deemed the move unconstitutional, the “National Congress created an 
additional legal obstacle to the referendum, passing a law preventing referenda from 
occurring 180 days before or after general elections.”34 Furthermore, the relational divide 
grew from just a division among the executive and the legislature to encompass the entire 
political spectrum as “the legislature, the judiciary . . . and four of the five political 
parties represented in the National Congress—including Zelaya’s own Liberal Party 
                                                 
30 Naoko Kada, “Comparative Presidential Impeachment: Conclusions,” in Checking Executive 
Power: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jody C. Baumgartner and Naoko Kada 
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 145. It is important to note that the term “legislative shield” is not attributed to 
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(PL)—opposed the referendum.”35 It is clear that political division and conflict were 
occurring between branches—even in and between political parties.  
The problem with totally relying on Baumgartner and Kada’s argument to answer 
the Honduran question is that first and foremost, Zelaya was not impeached.36 In 
addition, their emphasis on public opinion motivating a congress to pursue impeachment 
of a president loses explanatory value in Honduras. While Zelaya’s approval rating in the 
beginning of 2009 was in the 30 percent range, “the year before the coup, only 24 percent 
of Hondurans expressed satisfaction with democracy, and only 44 percent said that they 
favored democracy over any other type of government.”37 Although public opinion of 
Zelaya was low, the Honduran public was clearly demonstrating high levels of apathy 
towards politicians and governments in general, even to the point of agreeing in 2008 that 
they “need a strong leader who does not need to be elected.”38 Thus, the low support for 
the president alone is unlikely to have caused the sudden removal of Zelaya—if low 
public opinion is the answer, then why was he not removed prior to June 2009? The other 
factors of their argument, specifically the media environment and international pressures, 
were arguably also not relevant in Honduras. Even though the referendum was 
questioned and consumed by media outlets,39 it appears media involvement in the form 
of “investigative journalism” was not a major causal factor in the removal; and 
international pressure was not evident in trying to get Zelaya to stand down from his 
pursuit of a referendum.40 
                                                 
35 Meyer, “Honduran Political Crisis,” 3. 
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In contrast to Baumgartner and Kada, this thesis shows that the relational 
problems between the executive, legislature, and political parties in Honduras were not 
necessarily on an institutional scale as Baumgartner and Kada posit. The 1993 book, 
Honduras: A Country Study notes that “Honduran politicians emphasize competition and 
power, not national problem-solving, and governing in Honduras is determined by 
personal authority and power instead of institutions.”41 Given this reality, this thesis 
argues that this incident escalated because of the actions the congress, courts, and the 
military took in direct response to the sentiments of the Honduran elite within these 
institutions, which emphasized the particularly sensitive issue of reelection in Honduras 
in the context of Zelaya’s shift to the radical left. 
Continuing with the impeachment theories, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s well-known 
research on early removals of presidents helps to explain cases in which Latin American 
legislatures have proven powerful vis-à-vis executives. In his book, Presidential 
Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, Pérez-Liñán expands on 
Baumgartner and Kada’s aforementioned work by assessing six cases of presidential 
removal of Latin American presidents who were impeached, resigned, or declared 
incapable of remaining president. He posits, “in all six cases military intervention was 
hardly a viable option and that media coverage of presidential scandals was powerful. 
Where the president failed to command support in congress, he was easily impeached.”42 
Furthermore, the author stresses that the larger the social protest against the president, the 
greater the probability exists of removal.43 Pérez-Liñán’s causal chain places presidential 
scandal accompanied by mass street protests at the beginning of the removal process, 
                                                 
41 Mark P. Sullivan, “Chapter 4. Government and Politics,” in Honduras: A Country Study, ed. Tim L. 
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while the legislature’s involvement, including the inability of a president to form the 
aforementioned “legislative shield” within the congress, occur as a result of the preceding 
social unrest.44  
While the author is right to highlight the power of some Latin American 
congresses in relation to the executive—unlike traditional research on legislatures in 
Latin America—and his emphasis on the need for a presidential scandal, his work alone 
does not completely explain what happened in Honduras. The primary concern of this 
thesis with Pérez-Liñán’s argument is that he determines militaries will not become 
involved, which is obviously a glaring contrast to the events in Honduras. Furthermore, 
the Honduran case is missing the key element of his argument in predicting the early 
removal of presidents, that of mass mobilizations, “while scandals and legislative politics 
are key to explaining the impeachment process, mass mobilization constitutes the main 
factor driving the actual removal of presidents from office—irrespective of the specific 
procedure employed.”45 Evidence provided by subsequent authors notes that “the 
Honduran presidential ouster took place in the absence of social protest . . . or without the 
participation of the ‘the street.’”46 Pérez-Liñán notes as well, “scandals were not present 
in all episodes of presidential removal, and the evidence suggests that [media] exposés 
were not strictly necessary for the emergence of public outrage against the president.”47 
This supports the aforementioned evidence that, even though it was present, media 
involvement did not appear to be a factor in the removal. Even so, the author’s emphasis 
on presidential scandal does appear to exist in the Honduran case, as Chapter II argues 
that the issue of reelection represents a scandal that fits his definition. Ultimately though, 
the author’s argument alone does not provide a clear answer to the Honduran question 
because of military involvement and the lack of social unrest. 
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In research conducted since the Pérez Liñán analysis, Mariana Llanos and Leiv 
Marsteintredet’s edited volume focuses on the overall phenomenon of presidential 
breakdown and the many ways it materializes. These authors, and most of the chapters 
within their work, hypothesize the opposite of Pérez-Liñán, in that they argue that it is 
only after division and conflict between the executive and legislature that popular 
uprisings ultimately lead to the removal of the president.48 Furthermore, they posit that 
isolated or weak presidents, as Valenzuela similarly argued, “are a common denominator 
of presidential breakdowns.”49 Overall, the authors surmise, “presidential breakdowns 
seem to be caused by the combined effect of a set or a conjunction of causal factors that 
intersect at a particular moment in time, creating a ‘perfect storm’ that hits a president.”50 
Within this “perfect storm” of executive-legislative relations, popular uprisings motivated 
by presidential scandals, and poor economic conditions is the other, less-studied element 
of “intra-governmental factors,” specifically referring to conflicts among those closest to 
the president.51 When these factors come to together, they indicate the early termination 
of a presidency is forthcoming. 
While the other factors in the authors’ causal chain have already been examined 
above, their emphasis on the effect of intra-governmental conflict in the casual chain will 
be shown to carry varying weights in the Honduran case. This element centers on 
relations between presidents and their vice presidents, as well as the coalition of support 
that surrounds the president during the crisis specifically regarding the presidential 
cabinet.52 Regarding the former, the relationship between the two leaders can determine 
whether or not in times of presidential crisis a vice president will stand with or against the 
president, knowing that one route could lead to his or her administration while the other 
to downfall with the president.53 Concerning the latter, ensuring that the coalition 
surrounding a president is intact and secure can be the saving grace for presidencies, 
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because “coalition breakdowns and splits in the ruling party and administration . . . 
weaken a president’s position in Congress, as well as his popularity and his credibility in 
various sectors . . . by exposing the internal disputes and difficulties that the president has 
handling them.”54 In Honduras, Zelaya’s vice president, Elvin Santos, had resigned to run 
for the presidency in 2009. It is understood that the two leaders clashed with each other,55 
yet, as Chapter II demonstrates, the conditions for his leaving office are not influential in 
the manner that Llanos and Marsteintredet posit for removal. Furthermore, considering 
Zelaya’s inner circle of political advisors, which is discussed at length in Chapter II, the 
resignation of his defense minister before the coup, and that one of the leaders of the 
movement against Zelaya was his Attorney General, it is clear that conflict was occurring 
among people surrounding the president, and thus, this aspect of the author’s causal chain 
is relevant to the removal question. 
Unlike the other authors introduced in this thesis, Llanos and Marsteintredet were 
able to partially test their hypothesis against the crisis in Honduras, given how recent 
their book was published. The authors note that while the case was still unfolding at the 
time of their writing, they do find that parts of their theory help to explain the case of 
Zelaya. First, they note that while militaries generally do not remove presidents anymore 
for the sake of taking over governing, they are still involved in the process of presidential 
removal as “in some cases the role of the armed forces was simply to persuade a 
president that ‘the game is over’ . . . or safely to escort a head of state from the 
presidential palace.”56 Additionally they note, “in the case of Honduras the military did 
not seek to take power,” as they immediately handed over authority to the next in the line 
of the succession.57 Regarding other factors in their “perfect storm,” the authors note that 
“the ouster of Zelaya follows a pattern of a creative reading of the constitution to  
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facilitate actions to remove presidents from office” by pointing out that in their volume of 
case studies, only three of those presented were actual cases of presidential 
impeachment.58  
They also demonstrate how Zelaya was an isolated president; further leading to 
his downfall from the presidency by noting that he alienated both his own party and 
caused frictions with the military by the firing of the commander of the armed forces.59 
Finally, and in contrast to Pérez-Liñán’s aforementioned argument, the authors found 
“there was no presidential scandal or economic crisis with sufficient dimensions to 
generate the public uproar.”60 Yet as stated above, it will be argued that the issue of 
reelection was a presidential scandal that, while not enough to upset the populace, did 
upset the governmental elites who matter more in the Honduran case than the general 
public. Furthermore, although the overall elements of their theory apply to the Honduran 
case, the theory alone does not offer a thorough explanation for the ouster of Zelaya; 
namely because they omit the reasons as to why the military and the judiciary acted to 
remove the president. 
Research conducted into this case revealed an argument presented by Michelle M. 
Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Ura. In a paper presented at the Coloquio Centroamericano 
in San José, Costa Rica, in 2010, the authors argue that this incident represents a strategic 
interaction among self-interested institutions that occurred when a game of checks and 
balances played out between the executive, the court, and congress. The authors use their 
paper on the Honduran crisis to demonstrate “inter-branch relations in 2008–9 to expand 
upon existing studies of institutional emergence.”61 They utilize a game theoretical model 
to show how in a political system not prone to checks and balances, the Honduran crisis 
exhibited a situation in which both actors and institutions were attempting to check the 
other; yet, once the game started, “both actors were in a situation where they lost if they 
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backed down” to the other.62 Backing down would have decreased relative institutional 
strength but could have “defined the right and power of the congress and court to check 
the executive.”63 Taylor-Robinson and Ura group the congress and courts together as one 
entity in conflict with the executive branch. They describe how the executive in Honduras 
is not used to be checked by the other branches, and thus, naturally it did not posit that 
the courts and congress would attempt to check its power concerning the referendum.64  
Likewise, the courts and congress did not stop checking the executive despite 
repeated refusals by the latter to obey the orders of the former.65 As a result, all branches 
collided into a conflict that could have been avoided. While this paper, and another 
similar to it written by the same authors, is heavily relied upon for evidentiary support in 
this thesis, the author’s answer to the same Zelaya question is not complete. While not 
necessarily wrong, the author’s argument has several flaws. First, they negate the impact 
the military had on the incident, almost neglecting to mention the highly politicized 
actions that the military undertook. Secondly, they lump the courts and congress together 
as one unit when, as this research will show, the incident was more about elite sentiments 
and the institutional response that followed rather than solely institutions battling against 
each other. Finally, the argument is not complete because it lacks a deeper understanding 
of the institution of reelection in Honduras—the key to answering the timing of Zelaya’s 
removal. Thus, the argument of their paper does not complete the puzzle regarding the 
removal question. 
2. The Issue of Reelection 
As previously mentioned, the actors aligning against Zelaya made the argument 
that the President’s proposed referendum was an attempt to try and “perpetuate himself in 
power,”66 which arguably posed a threat to democratic order. After Zelaya’s refusal to 
obey the court order to halt the referendum, critics even went so far as to claim, “he was 
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planning an institutional coup that would dissolve Congress and immediately call a 
constitutional assembly.”67 Furthermore, it has already been demonstrated that the laws 
protecting reelection are extremely respected in Honduras given their stone clad nature. 
These factors support Pérez-Líñan’s claim that scandals threatening the regime precede 
removals. Even though “the referendum did not propose specific constitutional changes, 
and any changes arising from an eventual assembly would take place after [Zelaya] left 
office,”68 the explanatory power of the scandal element is shown to carry significant 
weight regarding this case. 
3. Judicial Behavior in Politics 
Considering the involvement of the judiciary in Zelaya’s removal, it is necessary 
to examine arguments surrounding courts in politics. Of the theories regarding judicial 
politics in Latin America, focusing on those that speak of the court’s relations with other 
branches is clearly most relevant to the Honduran case. Specifically, this area of research 
“relates to the conditions under which courts will exercise power by challenging the other 
branches of government when they deem that elected leaders have overstepped their 
constitutional or legal bounds.”69 The literature observes three main categories by which 
national judiciaries can be placed: a powerful court that plays a strong role in policy 
making, a court with strong “formal power, but for different reasons are reluctant or 
unable to assert it consistently,” and finally, a court limited in executing its power and 
randomly involves itself in political matters.70 The degree of power a court demonstrates 
does not depend on what influences the decisions of courts to engage the other branches; 
rather, the “overall political environment and institutional factors within courts” serve as  
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the dependent variables to political action.71 Three theories of judicial politics have 
emerged from within this literature that help to explain judicial involvement in political 
matters. 
The first approach is that of Gretchen Helmke who, focusing on the Argentine 
courts, posits that as executives near the end of their first terms in office, judges who fear 
the weakness of their institution is too great to stand against the incoming government 
will increase their rulings against the current administration, and engage in what she calls 
“strategic defection,” even if the judges were appointed under that administration.72 Her 
theory stems from the aforementioned political environment and institutional weaknesses 
that motivate judicial behavior.73 This theory logically aligns with the Honduran case as 
just over five months prior to Zelaya’s removal, the new Supreme Court was appointed, 
which lends credence to Helmke’s instability element—a newly appointed court lacked 
the security blanket of tenure and arguably allowed them to oppose Zelaya knowing his 
term was ending soon. Since Honduras had no vice president, and the next in line to the 
presidency was the President of Congress Roberto Micheletti, who supported Zelaya’s 
ouster, it is not hard to imagine the court would have no fear in opposing Zelaya knowing 
that the incoming administration already supported them. However, Chapter III 
demonstrates that Helmke’s argument cannot be ruled either in or out in the Zelaya case 
given the circumstances surrounding the court’s appointment and their ruling in favor of 
Zelaya’s decree of a minimum wage increase.  
Another theory supported by the work of Jeffrey Staton, also originating from a 
study of the Argentine system, takes the position that “courts may feel empowered to 
challenge elected leaders in high-stakes cases (even when facing opposition from a 
hostile executive branch) if sufficient societal support exists for a challenging 
decision.”74 He posits that the degree to which the public favors the court’s ruling against 
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a major political issue can factor into the “strategic calculations” that judges make to 
determine if their involvement will benefit them or not and the potential retaliation of 
other branches.75 While it has been previously demonstrated that Zelaya’s public opinion 
was low along with the government as a whole, Chapter III presents evidence that 
Stanton’s public opinion argument cannot be ruled out.  
A final approach to judicial theories is generated by Lisa Hilbink who examines 
the role of the Chilean judiciary in response to the Pinochet regime in her 2007 book, 
Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship. Starting from a basic 
understanding that one of the main functions of the judicial system is to guarantee human 
rights in accordance with the law, Hilbink argues that because of the ideological structure 
of the courts system, judges did not counter the dictatorial regime of Pinochet in the face 
of egregious human rights violations.76 The Chilean court system was focused on internal 
promotions and not antagonizing the upper echelons of the hierarchy by challenging the 
regime, a move that could render the anatgonizers unable to promote.77 She argues that 
an “apolitical” culture—meaning judges who took “principled stands in defense of those 
who challenged the traditional order”—along with “incentives operating on judges . . . 
encouraged conformity and reproduced conservatism within the institution.”78 Yet 
Hilbink also found in her research that “when left-wing presidents sought to exercise 
(longstanding legal) executive prerogatives to advance their reform agendas, the courts 
proved cognizant and capable of invoking constitutionalist principles to check 
government excesses.”79 While this finding resembles the Honduran case, Hilbink’s 
overall argument that the institutional structure of the court system stifled political 
involvement does not completely answer the Zelaya question. Instead, this thesis posits 
that her argument must be worked in reverse; thereby, predicting a politicized court that  
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became involved in the incident. All the aforementioned associated theories of judicial 
behavior, while not necessarily identical to the Honduran case, are relevant and the 
results of research testing are discussed further in Chapter III. 
4. The Military’s Role 
Given that the military played an influential role in the ouster of Zelaya, an 
examination of civil-military relations is necessary. Theories regarding military coups in 
Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s are seemingly no longer plausible to civil-military 
relations in modern times. Many scholars have made it known that since the shift to 
democracy, coups are virtually a thing of the past. Consuelo Cruz and Rut Diamint note, 
“the tanks that not too long ago roamed the streets have vanished from sight, military 
uniforms seem passé and coups obsolete, and the era of generals appears finally to have 
been consigned to the archives.”80 Since military rule is no longer an option in the region, 
civil-military relations are improving as politicians and generals adapt to a new chapter in 
their relationship.81 Out of this new relationship, two arguments theorize the importance 
of civilian control of the military.  
First and foremost, it is necessary to demonstrate that the Honduran military was 
indeed politically involved in this situation. The limitations of this literature for present 
purposes are obvious, given that in the Honduran case, the military was a protagonist in 
the political arena that took the initiative to remove Zelaya from the country. In fact, the 
Honduran military involved itself in politics prior to Zelaya’s removal. Before the 
incident, Zelaya’s opposition was courting the military to disobey the president’s orders 
to hold/oversee the referendum; thus, “the dismissal of the head of the Joint Chiefs 
(General Romero Vásquez Velásquez) and the resignation of Defense Secretary 
Edmundo Orellana [along with the heads of the army, navy, and air force] was a logical 
consequence of the political and juridical pressure exerted on the military for several 
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days.”82 Arguably, this political pressure on the armed forces was not the fault of the 
military; yet, once the Supreme Court reinstated Vásquez to his post, “he started joining 
in marches and street protests and giving interviews to the opposition media, clearly 
placing himself on the side of the political-economic-media alliance” arrayed against 
Zelaya.83 Moreover, knowing that obeying the orders to execute the referendum would 
have “strengthened the president’s hand by showing that he had won the soldiers to his 
side,” General Vásquez refused to obey the order by citing a constitutional article that 
prohibited him from following illegal instructions.84  
David Pion-Berlin posits that without a substantial knowledge of defense matters, 
civilian leaders could have a hard time leading the military unless they are able to 
manage the forces in such a way that extensive defense knowledge becomes a negligible 
condition.85 He presents J. Samuel Fitch’s argument that civilians must delineate specific 
security missions and applicable threats, provide a “sensible budget . . . set defense 
policy,” and “exert oversight on military education and socialization.”86 If these elements 
of civil-military relations are missing, military subordination could be called into 
question and conflict could arise.87 Absent extensive defense knowledge, politicians must 
still manage the military, and the military must realize its “firm constitutional obligation 
to fulfill policy in a subordinate manner.”88 While the author’s argument seems logical, 
some of the successes he describes in civil-military relations stand in stark contrast to the 
Honduran situation. 
Pion-Berlin notes, “The balance of power has moved decisively in favor of 
democratic governments in . . . Honduras.”89 He describes how successes in civil-military 
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affairs have included the reduction and disappearance of even the threat of coups, the 
lack of political influence the military has in government, which has previously been 
determined to be false in Honduras, and that “presidents have legal command over their 
forces, and militaries honor that command.”90 Even though President Zelaya had an 
outstanding relationship with the military when he came into office, primarily because he 
increased the organization’s budget, the presidential crisis in Honduras did not 
demonstrate the picture of civil-military relations that the author posits. As well, Ruhl 
notes that the political opposition to Zelaya began to court the military to join them in the 
“conspiracy to oust Zelaya” prior to the political events described above.91 In addition, 
although the military legally disobeyed Zelaya’s referendum order, they disobeyed the 
Supreme Court by deposing the president from the country—a clearly insubordinate act 
against the civilians who ordered their involvement. In short, the Honduran military’s 
behavior clearly defies theories that argue that militaries no longer engage in politics. 
More relevant to the Honduran case is a post-authoritarian civil-military argument 
that focuses on rational military decision making and allows militaries to disobey the 
executive to the point where they contribute to the early removal of the president. Pion-
Berlin and Harold Trinkunas posit that when governments are faced with mass 
mobilization, presidents can order the military to suppress protesters; thus, forcing the 
military into a cost-benefit analysis of whether or not to obey the order.92 By pointing out 
that militaries in Latin America “are more prone to respect political leaders as legitimate 
principals and accept their own subordinate agent status,” militaries that decide to 
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disobey their principals should do so by “quartering” themselves rather than inciting 
rebellion or repression.93 In doing so, militaries incite a “constitutional crisis, not a 
military takeover” whereby civilian actors are left to formulate a conclusion to the 
event.94 That is, whether or not the president survives the ordeal is up to the civilians, as 
the military has excused itself from the conflict.95 For the authors, “there is a 
compounding of risks associated with either rebellion or repression. By contrast, military 
quartering—even in defiance of the president—appears to be the safest of the three 
strategies.”96 In contrast to Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ argument, the expatriation of 
Zelaya by the military is evidence of military initiative to push back against and even 
remove the president. Even though Zelaya’s weak status may have made the military’s 
risk assessment easier, consistent with Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, given that it was 
unlikely that the incoming government would exercise reprisal, this rational-actor 
approach to civil-military relations still does not project that the armed forces would 
break the law by illegally deposing the president from the country. 
Since these two relevant modern day theories on civil-military relations do not 
provide a clear explanation for the military’s behavior in the Zelaya case, this thesis 
posits that a return to the theories of old is necessary. Chapter IV discusses how Alfred 
Stepan’s 1973 “new professionalism” argument best explains the military’s intervention 
and provides justification for their illegal actions of expatriating the president. In 
addition, the evidence shows support for Brian Loveman’s 1999 book, For La Patria: 
Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, in that “the military acts when the 
judgment is made that governments have put la patria at risk.”97 Finally, Samuel 
Huntington’s argument that coups occur as a result of weak state and party institutions in 
his 1968 book, Political Order in Changing Societies, is shown to hold explanatory value 
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regarding the military’s involvement. These theories, as research in Chapter IV shows, 
are reinforced by the longstanding hatred of leftist Honduran leaders by the military.  
5. Policy Diffusion and Political Contagion 
Two final theoretical subjects considered in testing whether Zelaya’s shift to the 
political left was a cause of his removal are that of policy diffusion and the idea of 
political contagion. Relevant for present purposes is the idea that Zelaya’s shift to the 
“radical” left, aligning with the highly polarizing figure of Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez, is what triggered opposition to and removal of Zelaya. Theories of diffusion and 
contagion stem from the idea that “a bold reform adopted in one nation soon attracts 
attention from other countries, which come to adopt the novel policy approach.”98 For 
Kurt Weyland, policy diffusion—or the spread and emulation of policy ideas that start in 
one country and filter to others—is primarily seen in regional geographic zones; 
“proceed[s] in waves—starting slowly, then gathering speed, and eventually taper[s] off;” 
and sees similar policies adopted in “diverse settings.”99 These fundamental elements of 
policy diffusion are potentially achieved through four separate causal analyses: the 
external pressure framework, the normative imitation approach, the rational learning 
approach, and the cognitive heuristics framework.100 The external pressure framework 
centers on the idea that “powerful external actors—especially international organizations 
(IOs)—promote an innovation and use the carrot and stick to induce countries to adopt 
the reform.”101 No evidence was found that organizations, such as ALBA (Bolivarian 
Alliance of the Americas) and Petrocaribe, were pressuring Zelaya to join their ranks; 
thus, this theory can discarded for present purposes. The normative imitation approach is 
a process in which “decision makers attempt to gain international legitimacy by 
importing advanced innovations and thus demonstrating the emulating country’s 
                                                 
98 Kurt Weyland, “Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform,” 
World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 262. 
99 Ibid., 265–267. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 269. 
 23
modernity and compliance with new international norms.”102 In essence, the imitators 
view the new ideas of other countries as potentially beneficial to their nation; thus, the 
former seeks the policies and processes of the latter. This argument, however, does not 
apply to the spread of the new left in Latin America because Weyland posits in his article, 
“The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory,” that the 
new left was “largely reviving the traditional rentier model” of the 1970s.103 Thus, the 
spread of this ideology, while arguably innovative, was not necessarily advanced or one 
that established new international norms.  
The last two approaches to explaining policy diffusion are similar in that they are 
focused primarily on the motives of decision makers.104 The rational learning model 
posits that as a country encounters a problem, it searches for a solution that other nations 
have implemented that it thinks could help solve its issue. Furthermore, the decision to 
adopt the new policy is based off a “thorough cost-benefit analysis” that has determined 
the policy will be successful based off empirical evidence from the country of the policy 
origin.105 The cognitive heuristics framework is similar to the rational learning method 
yet differs in that the success of the policy is not determined prior to adoption.106 No 
evidence was found that Zelaya made a calculated cost-benefit analysis regarding his 
shift to Chávez’s left; thus, the former model is ruled out. The latter model, however, as 
Chapter II demonstrates, best explains Zelaya’s blossoming relationship with Hugo 
Chávez that grew steadily throughout his presidency, right up until his ousting. 
Similar to policy diffusion, Stephen M. Walt surmises that “political contagion” 
exists when “countries emulate improvements perceived to have served other nations 
well.”107 For Walt, this behavior occurs when countries need to fix a domestic problem 
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and seek the guidance and example set forth by other countries; however, “these 
dynamics can fuel a sudden outbreak of revolutionary activity . . . or cause an alliance to 
collapse if a single, visible defection induces the other members to back out as well.”108 
The author notes that the spread of political ideas results from “universal appeal . . . 
connectivity,” and “similarity” among the countries involved.109 Along with the 
cognitive heuristics explanation of policy diffusion, the idea of political contagion is 
evidenced in the empirics of the Honduran case and is explained more in depth in 
Chapter II. These theories alone, however, do not answer the main question about 
Zelaya’s ouster. What is perhaps most relevant to keep in mind for present purposes is 
that Zelaya’s shift to the “radical” left—regardless of its causes—happened well before 
elites mobilized against him, and, thus was not sufficient to remove him from power. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis utilizes the case study approach in examining the removal of President 
Zelaya in Honduras. The aspects of the relationship between the Honduran elites in the 
legislature, military, and courts specifically during the months leading up to the coup are 
analyzed and how these institutions responded as a result of this relationship. 
Furthermore, an examination of the histories of each actor, specifically regarding the 
military, uncovered similar instances to that of the Zelaya case in the past. Special 
attention is given to the time frame that Zelaya indicated a shift in political ideology to 
the left and how this move was viewed by the aforementioned elites, institutions, and the 
public in general. The thesis also contains a crucial comparative element that reviews 
multiple political crises across time triggered by the efforts of presidents—at different 
locations along the left-right ideological spectrum—to introduce reelection into the 
presidency. Analysis and research was drawn and collected mostly from secondary 
sources, such as books, scholarly articles, government reports, country specific studies on 
Honduras, and analytical works explicitly discussing the overall situation and the legality 
of the incident. Moreover, an in depth study of primary sources, such as newspaper 
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articles and editorials written around the time of the coup, provided a clear picture of 
what was happening on the ground in Honduras and the reaction to it by the people 
watching it unfold in real time. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis relies on a case study approach to investigate the circumstances behind 
the removal of President Zelaya. Chapter II, “Honduran Politics, Intra-Governmental 
Relationships, Party Politics, Zelaya’s Ideology, and the Institution of Reelection,” first 
examines the political history of Honduras. It then provides an in-depth look at the 
landscape of party politics and intra-governmental conflicts occurring prior to Zelaya’s 
removal. The chapter concludes with the demonstration of evidence indicating Zelaya’s 
shift to the ideological new left and reveals what this thesis posits is the true reason 
behind the President’s removal: those in the elite thought he was attempting to change the 
institution of reelection, a threat they would not stand for. Chapter III, “The Political 
Honduran Supreme Court,” discusses the appointment process of the new court and sheds 
light on the extreme politicization of the institution. The chapter concludes with an 
explanation of the aforementioned theories that explain the court’s involvement. Chapter 
IV, “The Political Honduran Military,” opens with a discussion of the extremely 
politicized nature of the Honduran military, which stems from its time in command of the 
government during the mid-twentieth century. The military’s ideological hatred of leftist 
ideology is explained and Alfred Stepan’s “new professionalism” argument, along with 
those of Loveman and Huntington, is shown to provide an answer that explains the 
actions of the military. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the possibility 
that the Honduran military could have been concerned with subsequent actions by the 
United States (U.S.) in response to their involvement with Zelaya’s ouster by invoking 
Kirk S. Bowman’s theory of militarization and democracy. Chapter V provides an 
overview of the thesis findings, a brief summary of what happened in the aftermath of 
Zelaya’s removal, and a look at how this issue was not about institutions battling one 
another, but, rather, it was about institutions responding to elite sentiments that resulted 
in the disruption of democratic order. 
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II. HONDURAN POLITICS, INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONSHIPS, PARTY POLITICS, ZELAYA’S IDEOLOGY, 
AND THE INSTITUTION OF REELECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter brings together three distinct theoretical links in varying theories on 
presidential removal to begin the process of formulating an answer to the removal 
question. Yet, before examining the presidential crisis of 2009 in Honduras, it is first 
important to understand the nation’s political history and background. In doing so, the 
first section of this chapter reveals the elitist and clientilistic nature of Honduran politics. 
The following section discusses Llanos and Marsteintredet’s intra-governmental conflict 
perspective (introduced in Chapter I) and establishes how the departure of Vice President 
Elvin Santos was not a reason for Zelaya’s removal. The subsequent section on party 
politics will clearly demonstrate a divide between both political parties and an internal 
split in Zelaya’s Liberal party itself, which provides evidence that the party politics piece 
of Baumgartner and Kada’s causal chain is applicable to the Honduran case. 
Additionally, the chapter reviews Zelaya’s shift to the political left and shows that the 
cognitive heuristics model of policy diffusion and elements of political contagion account 
for this ideological shift. Finally, the concluding sections show how Zelaya’s leftward 
swing alone was not the reason he was removed. Rather, his downfall can only be 
understood by analyzing the combination of the threat of changing the institution of 
reelection, which constitutes a presidential scandal similar to that of Pérez-Liñán, with his 
newfound leftist ideology. This argument is the central finding of this thesis. 
B. POLITICAL HISTORY OF HONDURAS: ELITISM, CLIENTILISM, AND 
THE CAUDILLOS IN CONTROL 
Like many other countries in Latin America, Honduras experienced military rule 
for much of the mid-twentieth century until the 1980s. After nearly 16 years of military 
rule, the Honduran people elected a constituent assembly in 1980 that led to elections for 
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the first democratically elected government in modern history.110 After two years of 
structuring a constitution for the new democracy, the new constitution came into effect on 
January 20, 1982.111 Even though it is considered by some to be the most “advanced” in 
the history of the nation, the document is “generally held to have little bearing on 
Honduran political reality” and contains “aspirations of ideals rather than legal 
instruments of a working government.”112 In addition to delineating the powers of each 
branch of government, the constitution specifically defines several provisions that may 
not be amended including “the amendment process itself, as well as provisions covering 
the form of government, national territory, and several articles covering the 
presidency.”113 Of critical relevance to the case at hand, and as mentioned in Chapter  
I, the length of a presidential term and the prohibition of reelection may not be amended 
either.114 The 1982 Constitution notes that each branch is “complementary, independent, 
and not subordinate to each other;”115 however, the executive has “traditionally 
dominated” the other branches because of the nature of its centralized power.116  
Honduras is a presidential system whereby a president is elected to one four-year 
term in office without the chance of reelection. Throughout its history “the Honduran 
state’s formal and informal center of authority [has been] the executive;” thus, yielding a 
political climate dominated by the president regardless whether that person is a civilian or 
military general.117 Even though the constitution did give the other branches of 
government some forms of checks and balances, “during the first 25 years of the regime 
neither branch exercised their rights.”118 Instead, this reality has fostered high degrees of 
clientilism and caudillo politics run by the elites of each institutional branch of 
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government. Rachel Sieder notes how these aforementioned methods create politicians 
who “tend to be responsive to specific clientele rather than the electorate.”119 The 
president has served as the “chief caudillo” because “throughout the [twentieth] century 
the president was accustomed to having autonomy to make policy unhindered by the 
Congress or Court.”120 The clientilistic and elitist nature of the Honduran political 
landscape has saturated the electoral process and incited corruption, as those elected 
appoint persons who have demonstrated political and party loyalty to government jobs 
rather than “having anything to do with the public trust.”121 These practices have thus 
“become a permanent characteristic not only of the political system, but also of private 
enterprise.”122 Due to the vast corruption that has grown from clientlism, “bribery is an 
almost institutionalized practice”123—a practice evident in the lead up to the crisis in 
2009. In general, “clientilism, patrimonialism and other informal practices are persistent 
within the political system and the political parties,”124 which are both run by the 
economic, social, and political elites.  
Like the branches of government discussed above, an elite group composed of  
“a small network of about 10 families that together controls most of the economy” runs 
the political parties.125 Elitism is most prevalent in Honduras’ two main political parties, 
the Liberals and Nationals. Within these institutions, “powerful party oligarchs with 
strong economic interest define the parties’ objectives and policies.”126 Both parties are 
not ideologically different from each other compared to other countries in the region, as 
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both are center-right.127 It is commonly accepted in Honduras among scholars that both 
parties espouse elitism through their support and defense of “the interest of the business 
elite” and serve as “patron-client networks more interested in amassing political 
patronage than in offering effective programs.”128 Evidence of such activities has been 
found by Michelle Taylor-Robinson whose research in Honduras showed that while in 
office, “both parties have been accused of corruption and political favoritism, as state 
resources (such as jobs, contracts, infrastructure projects) have been distributed to 
supporters, and opposition supporters have been excluded from the spoils.”129 This 
modus operandi has had negative consequences for the parties themselves, given that 
public opinion polls demonstrate that they are “the least trusted institutions within the 
political system.”130 Yet, this elitist nature did not stop political reforms from occurring. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, “institutional reforms were carried out in 
the military, police, judicial system, and the electoral process.”131 Specifically, in 1997, 
several reforms “provided the political system with more openness and resulted in greater 
legislative independence from the executive.”132 Even so, the level of democratic 
consolidation that Honduras had achieved was still in question until the appointment of 
the first civilian head of the military in the late 1990s.133 As a result, “Honduras’s 
democratic regime finally merited scores of ‘free’ and ‘fully democratic’ from 
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organizations like Freedom House, and scholars using systematic scoring systems to 
evaluate the democratic nature of regimes.”134  
It is hard to argue to the contrary that this brand of consolidated democracy in 
Honduras has been “built on the anti-democratic bipartite model and on the dichotomy 
between formal democracy and social and economic democracy;” thus, providing a 
“fertile breeding ground for authoritarianism and the remilitarization of the state.”135 
Look no further than to the events of June 2009 to verify the aforementioned statement. 
Writing in 2003, Caroline Boussard stated, “overall, the Honduran political society is best 
described as weak, with little routinization or institutionalization.”136 As a result of this 
finding, she posits that the principal worry for the stability of democracy in Honduras 
does not appear to be the treat of a military coup, “but rather the weaknesses of political 
institutions and civilian politicians’ disrespect of democratic rules.”137 Yet, what 
transpired with the 2009 Honduran crisis not only showed a politician’s disrespect for 
democratic rule, it also resembled a military coup. 
C. INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
Chapter I noted that the conflict between President Zelaya and his Liberal Vice 
President Elvin Santos was not part of the causal chain that led to Zelaya’s removal. Yet, 
research has revealed that an influential conflict—but not between the president and his 
deputy. Rather, it appears to have been between Santos and the Liberal President of 
Congress, Roberto Micheletti. By the time major opposition among Honduran political 
elites towards Zelaya emerged in early 2009, Santos was no longer vice president. 
Therefore, Llanos and Marsteintredet’s argument that tension between the executive and 
his deputy push out presidents does not hold for this case. Before examining the conflict 
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further, a quick explanation of the articles in the constitution that speak to the issue of 
president and vice president conflict is needed. “In 1998, the Honduran Congress 
modified article 239 . . . of the Constitution to include the Vice President among the list 
of those who cannot run for President.”138 Furthermore, in 2002, the Congress voted to 
remove the restriction, in article 240, barring the president of Congress from running as a 
candidate for the presidency.139 Perhaps unaware of the law, in 2008, Elvin Santos, then 
the sitting vice president of Honduras, was declared a candidate for the presidency for 
which elections were to be held in November 2009. Yet, “on August 24, 2008, the 
Supreme Election Tribunal (TSE) voted overwhelmingly to reject placing [his] name as a 
Candidate for President in the Primary of the Liberal Party of Honduras.”140 As a result, 
Santos had to find an alternate to run in his place.141  
“On November 7, the Supreme Court determined that the constitutional reforms to 
article 239 and 240 [which in current form is the article that lists those persons who are 
not eligible to become president] of the constitution were unconstitutional;” thus, they 
should return to their original reading.142 Therefore, the vice president was allowed to 
seek election to the presidency. Thus, “on November 18, 2008, Elvin Santos submitted 
his irrevocable resignation to Congress, which then considered and rejected it.”143 Given 
that “being President of Honduras was Micheletti’s obsession or addiction,”144 it is no 
surprise that the Congress he presided over voted to reject Santos’ resignation, and 
subsequently, barred him from running for president. Micheletti would have been Santos’ 
main challenger in the primary. He accused Santos of “lying to the people,” and claimed 
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“he is not a candidate, he cannot be a candidate.”145 Even so, Santos’s stand-in, Mauricio 
Villeda Bermudez, won the primary and became the Liberal candidate for president. 
In a strange twist of events, perhaps accepting his obvious defeat, Micheletti’s 
Congress “reconsidered, and accepted the resignation of Elvin Santos as Vice President” 
in December 2008.146 Furthermore, the Congress decreed that so long as the vice 
president resigned “at least 6 months before the election,” he could legally run for 
president.147 Bermudez resigned his stand-in position, which cleared the way for Santos 
to take his place and “at midnight on [December] 18, the [TSE] met and inscribed him as 
the Liberal Party candidate for President.”148 Given this sequence of events, it does not 
seem that intra-governmental rifts occurred between Santos and Zelaya that resulted in 
the former’s resignation. Even though “some senior figures in his own party [were] losing 
patience with Zelaya,”149 Santos did not appear to be one of them.  
The only potential evidence of strife between the president and his deputy is 
demonstrated in the Zelaya-Micheletti relationship surrounding Congress’s approval of 
Honduras joining Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s ALBA. Micheletti initially did 
not support ALBA, but decided to support it “in exchange for joint efforts with Zelaya to 
impede [Santos] . . . from registering as a candidate.”150 Considering this situation in the 
context of the events above, it appears only that Zelaya entered this alliance with 
Micheletti to secure approval for ALBA and was not able, or did not try, to hold up his 
end of the deal in preventing Santos’s registration. Given that, no significant evidence 
appears to exist of a conflict between the president and his vice president, Llanos and 
Marsteintredet’s claim of intra-governmental conflict leading to presidential removal 
loses explanatory value in the Honduran case. More importantly, the situation with Elvin 
Santos and Roberto Micheletti points to a primary theme in the discussion of the causal 
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chain that brought down Zelaya. The situation amplifies Baumgartner and Kada’s 
argument that the dynamics and relationships of party politics can lead to presidential 
removal as the conflict strains relations between the executive and the legislature. This 
element of the causal chain is examined in a subsequent section. 
D. THE RISE OF THE LEFT 
Before examining the rifts Zelaya created amongst the political parties, including 
intra-party conflicts, which the previous section has already eluded to given that those 
involved were members of the Liberal Party, it is necessary to examine the ideas of 
policy diffusion, political contagion, and the new left in Latin America in the causal chain 
discussed in Chapter I. The severity of the conflict surrounding intra-party politics cannot 
be understood fully regarding the Zelaya case without a thorough comprehension of what 
ideological changes the President was undergoing in his first years in office. Writing in 
2007, Mitchell Seligson, analyzing Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
surveys from 2004 and 2006, found that it “appears that there has been a recent shift to 
the left” in ideology among the populace in Latin America.151 Furthermore, Steven 
Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts note, “by 2009, nearly two-thirds of Latin Americans 
lived under some form of left-leaning national government.”152 Even so, it is still 
important to understand that overall, the average ideological trend of the populace in the 
region continues to remain slightly to the right of center.153  
What is the new left in Latin America and who leads it? It is widely accepted 
among scholars of Latin American politics that the rise of the new left in Latin America 
began in response to the neoliberal economic reforms of the mid-to-late twentieth century 
in the region. According to Kurt Weyland, the new left conflicted with neoliberalism, 
“the right-wing advocacy of thorough-going market reform,” because the idea imposed 
limitations on economic practices by espousing, “the market is there to stay, it has global 
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dimensions, and it imposes significant constraints of sovereign countries, especially in 
the Third World.”154 The new left’s response was not unified; it developed into a radical 
sect and a more moderate sect. “In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador . . . a radical left 
emerged out of popular rejection of the market model, nationalist skepticism about 
globalization, fierce repudiation of the established political class, and a questioning of 
pluralist, representative democracy.”155 In contrast, the more moderate left evidence in 
countries, such as Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay recognizes “a basic claim of the political 
right, namely, the need to respect constraints, especially limitations arising from global 
capitalism and domestic market reform and form (sic) liberal, representative 
democracy.”156 The left that Zelaya grew enamored with was the radical left led by 
Venezuela’s Chávez. This sect of leftism is a threat to centrists and those on the right 
because, according to Weyland, “it has pursued a hegemonic project and invoked popular 
sovereignty to revamp the institutional framework through new constitutions” through the 
use of “a majoritarian, plebiscitarian discourse to dismantle checks and balances and 
concentrate power in charismatic leaders.”157 This type of response is arguably what the 
elites in Honduras feared the most by Zelaya’s budding relationship with Chávez, and 
they claimed it was evidenced by his referendum. 
The fact that Manuel Zelaya was gradually moving toward the ideological left 
during his presidency will be shown as undeniable. Furthermore, finding an answer as to 
why he chose to shift his ideology is perhaps not as puzzling or shocking as might be 
thought. “In the Latinobarometer survey for 2006 the average ideological score for 
Hondurans was 6.17 on a 0–10 scale where 0=left and 10=right, while the average for all 
18 Latin American countries in the survey was 5.35.”158 Yet, in 2007, the score for 
Honduras was 5.72, and in 2008, it was 5.64, a drop of 0.53 in the two years preceding 
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the coup159—a clear indication, albeit a small one, that the ideology of the country was 
slowly sliding to the left. Perhaps Zelaya was following the lead of the nation that elected 
him to office. It appears that Zelaya demonstrated the cognitive heuristics explanation of 
policy diffusion regarding his shift to the left. This model amplifies one of the main 
features of policy diffusion: geographic “proximity prompts imitation.”160 The model 
claims that “a bold innovation attracts disproportionate attention from neighboring 
countries; it is then widely adopted on the basis of its apparent promise, not its 
demonstrated success.”161 Given that radical leftism spread to Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Honduran neighboring Nicaragua, the geographical proximity element of this type of 
policy diffusion is evident. Furthermore, Weyland notes in an article published in January 
2009, that, “the prototype of leftist radicalism in contemporary Latin America [had] not 
had an impressive performance.”162 Even though the radical leftist model was not 
successful, cognitive heuristics predicts that leaders will still move to implement it. 
Zelaya’s view of the radical left supports the cognitive heuristics model of policy 
diffusion. On October 30, 2009, the Council on Foreign Relations published an interview 
with Christopher Sabatini, Senior Director of Policy and Editor-in-Chief of Americas 
Quarterly, in which he stated his belief as to why Zelaya attempted to imitate Chávez: “It 
was pure . . . opportunism . . . he is in many ways an opportunistic demagogue and what 
Chávez represented to him was a plan for sustaining himself in power.”163 Sabatini 
explained that Zelaya hoped to benefit from Chávez’s wealth of oil revenue; thus, giving 
him “a potential plan to be able to consolidate his own authority and extend himself in 
power.”164 Ultimately, Sabatini says, “the truth is he was really just an opportunist and  
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was really using this for his own self-promotion.”165 Weyland’s cognitive heuristics 
explanation of policy diffusion arguably explains Zelaya’s shift to the radical left in Latin 
America. 
Stephen M. Walt’s argument regarding political contagion is also evidenced by 
Zelaya’s imitation of Chávez. As Chapter I noted, Walt’s theory claims that the “causes 
of contagion” are influenced by universal appeal, connectivity, and similarity.166 
Regarding universal appeal, Walt notes, “certain political movements are more likely to 
spread simply because they possess features that make them broadly appealing.”167 The 
previous paragraph clearly shows that Zelaya viewed Chávez’s radical left as appealing, 
despite its lack of apparent success; thus, supporting the first element of Walt’s theory. 
Second, concerning connectivity, Walt says, “the more extensive the connections 
between different groups, the greater the potential for contagion.”168 His connectivity 
element specifically speaks to how readily ideas can move across borders.169 “Improved 
global communications have made it easier for like-minded individuals and groups to 
coordinate their actions across national borders and to create more enduring and powerful 
transnational networks.”170 Zelaya, Chávez, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales, and 
Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega, undoubtedly communicated with one another; also, 
as shown later in this chapter, they had face-to-face meetings, specifically during a 
celebration of the Sandinista movement in Managua, Nicaragua. Furthermore, Chávez 
made official visits to Honduras in January and August 2008, which clearly put the two 
leaders in communication with each other. The final element, similarity, indicates that 
“when two societies are roughly similar, a development that is popular in one of them is 
more likely to seem relevant and desirable in the other.”171 Given that both Venezuela 
and Honduras were arguably Third World countries at the time, they can be classified as 
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roughly similar. Furthermore, the ALBA initiative, which is examined later in this 
chapter, was attractive to Zelaya, and was one of the relevant and desirable policy 
initiative factors of the similarity element. Clearly, Walt’s political contagion argument 
allows for Zelaya’s shift to the radical left and alliance with Hugo Chávez.  
Regardless, Zelaya’s leftward shift still seems puzzling given that “when [he] was 
the Liberal Party’s candidate for president in 2005, he was not known to diverge notably 
from his party . . . and his campaign platform in 2005 did not appear to have a left-
leaning bent.”172 The ultimate problem however, as Taylor-Robinson and Ura point out, 
is that he was moving away “from the ideological preference of the median member of 
the congress or the Court, and from the conservative ideology of the major political 
parties.”173 Furthermore, Ruhl notes, “Zelaya knew that his shift to the left would 
alienate the traditional political class and private business sectors, but he hoped to build a 
new political movement among the majority of Hondurans who had become disillusioned 
with traditional party elites and democratic institutions.”174 Having arguably established 
the reasoning why Zelaya shifted left, the focus must shift to the effects that his 
newfound ideology had on his own political party and party politics in general—a critical 
issue in the causal chain. 
E. POLITICAL PARTY CONFLICT 
So far, this chapter has examined elements of the causal chain leading to the 
removal of President Zelaya. Yet, one such element, the movement to the left—even 
Chávez’s radical left—is not sufficient enough by itself to explain Zelaya’s removal. This 
section demonstrates Baumgartner and Kada’s emphasis on political party conflict, both 
among and between, in the removal causal chain in that the conflict escalated due to his 
leftward shift. When Mel Zelaya was sworn in as president in January 2006, he was a 
“traditional law-and-order, pro-business president oriented toward continued association 
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with the United States.”175 Throughout the initial weeks and months of his term, Zelaya 
acted in accordance with the boundaries of the Honduran political system: practicing 
elitism and continuing clientilistic policies. “The first year he apparently tried to establish 
alliances within the Liberal Party, as well as with the economic and political groups that 
control the reins of power.”176 In fact, he “relied for political support on a wide range of 
Liberal factions represented in his cabinet and ignored the leftist popular organizations 
that would later rally around him.”177 Furthermore, he displayed the norms of the 
Honduran political system by aligning with the Liberal President of Congress, Micheletti. 
A deal was brokered between the two that if Micheletti supported the passage of Zelaya’s 
initial policies in the legislature, the President would guarantee Micheletti’s election as 
President of Congress.178 Yet, despite his best efforts, Zelaya appears to have made a 
fundamental mistake: he developed a “reputation as impulsive, confrontational 
leader,”179 arguably overlooking a critical dynamic between that of the party system and 
political history in general—both parties have preferred to coexist without confrontation. 
Zelaya created a politically confrontational environment because he chose to 
“govern from within the Liberal Party’s closed circle.”180 The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index (BTI) 2012 noted that because of the elitist nature of the political 
parties and their economic, political, and family connections “the political culture is 
marked by an avoidance of direct confrontation among leaders, and by an exaggerated 
inclination toward consensus building.”181 The Liberal party is highly factionalized with 
different groups acting as small parties themselves that engage in constant party 
infighting.182 To his fault, “Zelaya opened the door to all these factions and shared out 
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the ministries amongst them. The result [was] that each group [had] turned its ministries 
into a power base for its members and a launching pad for the next elections.”183 In doing 
so, Zelaya harbored an administration with no clear objectives or guidance that allowed 
those closest to him to demonstrate “demagogic, improvised and almost provisional 
reactions” to politics and governing.184 Ultimately, a confrontational intra-party political 
environment was bred that did not function in Honduras. The largest of these factions that 
created political conflict was that of the populist left led by Liberal Party executive and 
Zelaya confidant, Patricia Rodas. 
Rodas, the leader of the Liberal Party during the first years of the Zelaya 
Administration, was clearly the center of gravity for Zelaya’s growing leftist rhetoric and 
ideology.185 She “had embraced Marxism and Central America’s revolutionary 
movements in her student days in the 1980s, but later had moderated her ideological 
stance in order to rise within the Liberal Party.”186 Now that her candidate was in office, 
she returned to her leftist ideological roots and advanced her initiatives through Zelaya’s 
presidency. Her followers, known as “the Patricians,” were instrumental in Zelaya’s 
election and after he had won, they “assumed the reins (sic) of the government.”187 As 
has been shown, Zelaya was not initially overtly leftist, yet the influence of the Patricians 
began to take effect in 2007, the year he began his move to the left,188 with his first 
public and emphatic embrace of Latin America’s new left. “Only two of Central 
America’s Presidents accepted the invitation to go to Managua to celebrate the 28th 
anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship” in July of 2007 in Nicaragua—
and Mel Zelaya was surprisingly one of them.189 Zelaya, accompanied by Rodas, stood 
alongside Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, Venezuela’s Chávez, and Panama’s 
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President Martín Torrijos, and espoused at the ceremony that he was “here to vehemently 
salute Central American unity . . . and the ideals of Simón Bolívar’s Pan-
Americanism,”190 the ideological roots of the new left. Zelaya’s left turn was not in 
ceremonial appearances alone; rather, he followed up his participation in Managua by 
pursuing Honduras’ admittance into Petrocaribe in December of 2007.  
Rosemary A. Joyce of the left leaning North American Congress on Latin 
America stated, “the most widely cited indication of Zelaya’s supposed ‘drift to the left’ 
was his move in December 2007 to join the regional oil alliance known as Petrocaribe, 
through which Venezuela sells oil to member states on favorable terms.”191 Zelaya could 
not enter Honduras into the alliance without the approval and consent of the National 
Congress that initially was not in favor of joining Chávez’s group.192 Yet, it did not 
appear that the problem with Petrocaribe was its leftist aura; rather “the primary concern 
for the Congress was how the oil savings would be used and supervised—the Congress 
wanted to set up a program that would allow oversight. When that was arranged the 
Congress voted to join Petrocaribe.”193 Moreover, Joyce notes that many of Zelaya’s 
“most fervent foes” were pushing for joining the group and “actually criticized [Zelaya] 
for being too slow to negotiate the stable, lower-cost oil supply that would fuel 
remarkable economic growth.”194 It does not appear that the issue regarding Petrocaribe 
was anchored in a fear of its leftist origins; rather it seems that political parties were 
fighting over how to manage the spoils of the program, which further provides evidence 
in support of Baumgartner and Kada’s argument. Arguably though, Zelaya’s opponents 
could have thought that the economic benefits of joining Petrocaribe could be great 
enough to warrant overlooking the leftist nature of the Chávez backed organization; 
however, Zelaya’s next move would incite more attention from his detractors and 
perpetuate the divide between the Liberals and Nationals. 
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On August 25, 2008, Chávez, Morales, Ortega, and Zelaya (newly minted by the 
group as the “Cowboy Commander”) met in Honduras to celebrate the ratification of the 
country’s entry into ALBA.195 Chávez had established ALBA to “combat neoliberal 
economic policies and U.S. influence in Latin America.”196 Perhaps, the President’s 
motive in joining the group was to reclaim some positive political ground among the 
country’s populace. Regardless, “Zelaya [believed] that ALBA [would] help him reinvent 
. . . himself as the bold leader facing off against the political and economic class.”197 Yet, 
doing so with an initiative, such as ALBA, seemed risky because of the rifts it was 
creating in and between the political parties all the while knowing that Honduras’ 
membership in ALBA would not continue after he left office.198 Furthermore, those on 
the political right in Honduras viewed joining ALBA “as contrary to the country’s 
international trade interests and in conflict with the country’s long time alliance with the 
U.S.”199 At this point in his term, no doubt existed that Zelaya, influenced by Rodas, was 
completely set on aligning Honduras with Chávez. When the measure on admission to 
ALBA came before the Congress, all National Party Deputies abstained from the vote.200 
Even so, given the aforementioned deal that Micheletti worked out with Zelaya, and the 
fact that the Liberals maintained a seven-seat majority in the unicameral legislature,201 
the Honduran National Congress, on a strictly party line vote, voted in favor of joining 
ALBA in October 2008.202  
Zelaya’s overt displays of his newfound ideology and his insistence on ALBA 
were troublesome for him politically as covert discussions circulating among the political 
elite regarding the President’s future began to emerge. During the Chávez ALBA visit to 
Honduras, rumors that Zelaya was pondering a break with constitutional rule began to 
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grow stronger as “rightwing sectors . . . argu[ed] that Zelaya [had] wanted to replace the 
National Congress with a Constituent Assembly all along;” he simply needed to solidify 
his leftist support before he could execute his alleged plan.203 In sum, the ALBA issue, 
more so than joining Petrocaribe, signified that Zelaya and his allies were challenging the 
elites of the political establishment and political parties. Although these initiatives did not 
necessarily “represent a drastic change for the country” as they presented “a small 
opening up to other markets that [did not] compromise the stronger business sectors,” the 
elites made it seem like a drastic change that would harm the polity and economy.204 This 
environment of political party conflict, as Baumgartner and Kada posit, thus became an 
early factor that would soon contribute to Zelaya’s ouster. Yet, the degree of separation 
and abandon between the two parties, while an interesting link in the chain, does not 
appear to be the most influential part. A closer examination of the actions of previous 
Honduran presidents leads to the discovery that the coup may not have been solely about 
the dynamics of party politics and Zelaya’s rejection of political norms in favor of the 
new left, or chavismo; rather, the entire issue rests on the institution of reelection itself. 
F. THE REELECTION ISSUE 
Most of the research conducted into the Honduran crisis posits that Zelaya’s shift 
to the new radical left in Latin America was the catalyst that prompted his removal. Yet, 
what this research has uncovered is that while the aforementioned factor is critical to the 
causal chain, it is not the last link. The issue that must accompany the ideological shift is 
that of reelection—an issue that fits Pérez-Liñán’s definition of presidential scandal. This 
section demonstrates how both the shift to the left and the desire for reelection must be 
present in the causal chain to yield the outcome of removal. Alexander Farr notes that 
after the turn away from the authoritarian military dictatorships of the mid-twentieth 
century in Latin America, many “legislatures often adopted the principle of ‘no 
reelection’ with the intention of limiting ‘the advantages of presidential incumbency in 
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countries where other forms of political accountability were weak.’”205 Noting how the 
degree of reelection varies from country to country in the region, Farr notes, “Honduras 
seems to embrace the strictest form by prohibiting reelection.”206 Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that the articles prohibiting reelection in Honduras have already 
been shown to be impenetrable. Even so, this fact alone does not appear to have 
prevented attempts at changing the statute.  
While examining the histories of former Honduran president, it was discovered 
that President Manuel Zelaya was not the first president in the history of the newly 
democratized Honduras to ever (allegedly) suggest, publicly or privately, reforming the 
constitution to allow for reelection.207 A closer look into the administrations of several 
former and acting presidents shows it was not a new phenomenon Zelaya originated. In 
1984, President Roberto Suazo Córdova, the first President of the newly democratic 
Honduras and member of the Liberal party, attempted to “change Congress into a 
constituent assembly to reform the Constitution.”208 After this attempt failed, the 
president “misused his influence over the Supreme Court of Justice and the TSE to 
manipulate the electoral process in hopes of staying in office beyond the single four-year 
term allowed.”209 President “Suazo’s attempts at continuismo [a widely used term in 
Latin America that signifies are president continuing in power] precipitated a 
constitutional crisis” that almost mirrored the case with Zelaya; it involved the President 
of Congress, the Supreme Court, and ultimately, led to mediation by the military.210 
While Suazo did not directly call for a vote on a constituent assembly, he clearly was in 
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favor of removing the restrictions on reelection. Furthermore, no evidence was found in 
any sources that Suazo had leftist leanings. Even after all his confrontations with the 
other branches of government, Suazo Córdova was not removed from office.  
This research also revealed that it does not appear that being a member of the 
Liberal Party presumes the desire for reelection. Before the military coups of the 1950s 
and 1960s, President Juan Manuel Gálvez, of the National Party, “attempted to push 
reforms permitting reelection through the congress, but the measure lost.”211 President 
Rafael Callejas, another member of the National Party, served as President of Honduras 
from 1990–1994. In 2005, as the president of the National Soccer Federation, he thought 
“that taking the soccer team to the final tournament would have raised [his] prestige 
significantly, helping pave the way to one of his most cherished dreams: a constitutional 
reform that would enable him to run for President again.”212 Joining Callejas was former 
Liberal President Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé, President of Honduras from 1998–2002. 
“Changing the Constitution’s untouchable, ‘stone-clad’ articles was a political aim that 
Flores Facussé and Callejas had been promoting since 1992.”213 In fact, both former 
presidents “discretely raised the issue in public” while “their circle of followers, who 
wanted to smash the stone tablets impeding their President’s reelection, pushed the issue 
much more zealously.”214 Neither Gálvez, Facussé, nor Callejas, were removed from 
office or ever expatriated from the country. Furthermore, no research indicated that any 
of them favored a leftist ideology. Yet, perhaps the most fascinating champion of 
reelection was none other than chief Zelaya opponent Roberto Micheletti. 
Research indicates that Micheletti had long been a fan of continuing the terms of 
presidencies. In fact, in 1985, when he was simply a Deputy of Congress, not its 
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President, he “attempted to prolong the presidency” of Suazo Córdova.215 Furthermore, 
articles from Revista Envío in 2007 indicate than an attempt by the elites to give the 
“bipartite model a face-lift” included Micheletti suggesting, “eliminating the provision 
barring presidential reelection.”216 Additionally, “a group of legal scholars in the 
Honduran Bar Association [had] similarly urged the government to consider calling a 
constituent assembly to draft a new Constitution that would allow reelection.”217 In the 
tradition of clientilism, Micheletti was also working behind the scenes with Flores 
Facussé and Callejas. After Zelaya and Micheletti worked the previously mentioned deal 
to get the latter elected president of Congress in exchange for passage of the former’s 
laws, specifically the citizen’s participation law, Micheletti promised Facussé that his 
daughter would be elected vice president of Congress in exchange for Facussé’s and 
Callejas support for the Liberal Party’s presidential nomination.218 The one condition the 
former presidents placed on Micheletti was that once he was elected, he would “reform 
the Constitution to remove a number of untouchable . . . ‘stone-clad’ articles;”219 one of 
which concerned the issue of reelection. This research clearly demonstrates that the 
desires, whether public or private, of four former presidents matched that of Zelaya’s. 
Thus, if the issue of reelection has been raised before and none of these four presidents 
are known to have leftist ideologies, then why was it that the elites and establishment 
went after Zelaya and not the others?  
The answer is simple: Zelaya was the only president who acted on his desire to 
change the reelection law with ties to the new left in Latin America. President Zelaya was 
removed not simply because of an institutional crisis of checks and balances; and, not just 
because he was aligning with Hugo Chávez. The recipe for crisis in Honduras was clearly 
a mixture of the new left coupled with the reelection issue that spurred the ouster. Further 
                                                 
215 Belen Fernandez, “‘Friendship Ends Where Duty Begins:’ An Interview with Honduran Coup 
General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez,” Counterpunch, November 25, 2009, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/11/25/an-interview-with-honduran-coup-general-romeo-v-aacute-
squez-vel-aacute-squez/. 
216 Moreno, “After 25 Years.” 
217 Ibid. 
218 Moreno, “No Ideal Solutions.” 
219 Ibid. 
 47
proof of this necessary connection is that in April 2009, Micheletti proposed “that 
President Zelaya grant the working class what is referred to as the ‘fifteenth salary’ on 
May Day in exchange for [Congress’] full backing of the fourth ballot box;”220 which 
would indicate that Micheletti himself, as has clearly been demonstrated, was now 
publicly offering support of the referendum—yet his removal was not pursued precisely 
because he was not associated with the threatening new left. Micheletti said the “coup 
saved Honduras from further influence by Venezuelan-style socialism or ‘Chavismo.’”221 
Thus, this ideology imposed by Zelaya sparked fears among the Honduran elite—fears to 
which Micheletti was responding.222  
“Zelaya’s simple proposal . . . was so threatening to the power elite that they 
could not wait the seven months remaining in Zelaya’s term and moved to have him 
deposed immediately.”223 Yet, this urgency would not necessarily have been present 
without the leftist rhetoric—and more importantly vice versa. For example, Liberal 
President Carlos Roberto Reina “came to office as a long-standing human rights 
advocate, owing to his treatment by the earlier Honduran military regimes, and with 
sympathy towards the social programs pursued by Cuba’s Fidel Castro.”224 Reina’s 
background suggests to some degree that he was influenced by Castro’s leftist ideology, 
which is widely accredited with influencing Hugo Chávez; yet, Reina was not removed 
from office because no evidence is available that he suggested reforming the reelection 
prohibition. Similarly, in 2007, when Zelaya and his cohorts of Patricians were beginning 
to align themselves with Chávez, “both Liberal and National party leaders [said] the 
easiest solution politically would be just [to] overthrow the government.”225 Despite 
considering the idea, the powers that be never acted until Zelaya coupled his leftist 
ideology with the desire for reelection—an equation that has shown itself necessary to 
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explain Zelaya’s removal. Simply espousing leftist rhetoric may be threatening, but if that 
were enough to remove him, then he would have been gone much earlier. Furthermore, as 
was shown above, the National Congress, even if on strict party lines at times, supported 
Zelaya’s leftist policies. Clearly, the issue of reelection could be defined as a presidential 
scandal like Pérez-Liñán posits; and, the omission of the significance of reelection from 
Llanos and Marsteintredt’s argument further weakens their overall theory tested against 
the Honduran case. It was only when his newly acquired ideology invoked changing the 
institution of reelection that he became too much of a problem that had to be dealt with in 
any way necessary.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that combining Baumgartner and Kada’s party 
politics link, Pérez-Liñán’s presidential scandal link, and Llanos and Marsteintredt’s 
intra-governmental affairs link provides one portion of the answer to the question 
regarding the removal of President Zelaya. Given the backdrop of the Honduran political 
system and the lack of intra-governmental conflict between Zelaya and Santos, it is clear 
that more was in play regarding the ouster of the president. Zelaya’s shift to the left 
caused great rifts between the political parties, including his own; thus, strengthening the 
coalition of political elites arrayed against him. “As a result of internalized power 
structures, a nonconfrontational political culture and external pressures, there was little 
political polarization before President Zelaya turned to left-wing populist rhetoric in 
2007–2008.”226 When the president did shift leftwards, however, “almost the entire 
political establishment harshly rejected Zelaya’s polarizing discourse.”227 The BTI 2012 
report indicates that this shift was the ultimate cause of Zelaya’s downfall; yet, this thesis 
has demonstrated that this shift was not the sole reason: it had to be accompanied by the 
desire to change the institution of reelection to say that ideological differences were the 
root cause of the crisis. Still, the aforementioned links in the causal chain do not account 
for the Supreme Court’s actions, which are examined in the next chapter. 
                                                 
226 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010—Honduras Country Report, 23. 
227 Ibid. 
 49
III. THE POLITICAL HONDURAN SUPREME COURT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Honduran judicial system is far from a model of legal excellence. It is widely 
considered the weakest branch of government “sensitive to . . . politicization and absen[t] 
of horizontal accountability.”228 As such, “political considerations have traditionally been 
more important than merit-based appointments for promotions within the judiciary.”229 
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán found that Honduras had one of the “most unstable” Supreme Courts 
in Latin America over the time period of 1904 to 2006.230 Clearly, politics and instability 
surround the high court, and these two elements shown brightly during the crisis in 2009. 
This chapter explains the political nature of the Supreme Court, analyzes the theoretical 
concepts of Helmke, Hilbink, and Stanton from Chapter I, and demonstrates how the 
minimum wage issue of 2009 suggests that the institution was simply responding to the 
elite’s fear of Zelaya’s attempt at reelection. 
B. THE NEW COURT 
Given the instability and corrupt nature of the judicial system, the government 
changed the way in which Supreme Court justices came into office. “Until 2000, 
Supreme Court justices were directly named by the party leaders represented in Congress, 
with the sole requisite of defending their interests.”231 In 2001, an amendment to the 
constitution changed the length of terms in office for justices from four years to seven 
years, which removed the coterminous nature of the three branches of government.232 
The change “created a Junta Nominadora made up of delegates from the National Human 
Rights Commission, Supreme Court, College of Lawyers, the Private Business Council, 
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the law faculty of the University of Honduras, civil society, and the Confederation of 
Workers.”233 This group was tasked with presenting a list of 45 nominees to the National 
Congress that would then vote on the election of 15 new justices with a simple two-thirds 
majority.234 “These new appointment rules were first implemented in 2002, and in 
January 2009 the second court appointed under these rules took office,” 235 although this 
second court was composed of eight Liberal Party justices and seven National Party 
justices. The goal of the reform was to create an autonomous and independent judiciary 
free from former executive domination, yet given that the political legislature was voting 
on the candidates, “it is unimaginable that the bipartite political system ha[d] ceased 
interfering in the judicial branch.”236 This situation was no more evident than when the 
voting for the new court occurred in January 2009. 
The tension evident between the new court and President Zelaya in June 2009 was 
present before the former was even sworn into office. The President was not pleased that 
none of his nominees had made the final list of 45, one of whom was the wife of a 
minister in his cabinet; thus, he attempted to influence their decision.237 “On the day of 
the vote [Zelaya] militarized the area around the Congress and press reports [said] a 
group of the president’s men, including the minister of defense, went to the Congress 
uninvited to turn up the heat.”238 This incident was clearly a demonstration by Zelaya 
that he was willing to challenge the elites to get his way—even using force if 
necessary.239 Given the highly volatile nature of the judicial election process in congress, 
the President of the body, Roberto Micheletti noted that the constitution allowed congress 
to reelect the same judges to a new term but that the legislature had chosen not to “for the 
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sake of preserving peace and love of country.”240 This incident arguably set the new 
Supreme Court at odds from the beginning with Zelaya, which would not help his cause 
in the coming months; but, as demonstrated below, this confrontation might not have 
been as influential as it may seem. 
C. POLITICS AS USUAL 
Given the way in which the justices were appointed, politicization of the court 
thus was, and is, a logical consequence. “At the end of each seven-year term the justices 
are up for reelection by the Congress. Though the new justices may represent a fresh start 
in terms of a break from former justices, the court . . . still maintains its party ties.”241 In 
fact, the magistrates in Honduras “have very close ties to the party leaders who appoint 
them and go on to pursue partisan loyalty in the judges they appoint . . . Judges identify 
themselves in conversation with other judges at international meetings as, for example  
. . . ‘Liberal party judges.’”242 Furthermore, “in 2003, two-thirds of Honduran judges 
identified membership in a political party as a paramount qualification for becoming a 
judge.”243 This heavy politicization created justices “less politically independent and 
more subject to pressure and integration with the policies and ideologies of the PN and 
the PL, including the respective internal factions within them.”244 This pressure, 
however, was not evident in the first major Supreme Court decision of the new court’s 
tenure. 
D. MINIMUM WAGE AND THE REELECTION BANDWAGON 
The actions of the new Supreme Court reinforce the idea that the leftist shift was 
not the solitary catalyst; rather, it was the reelection threat that set the wheels in motion. 
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Both the court and Zelaya got off to a bad start, but the former did not always disagree or 
rule against the latter. In fact, they even refused the appeals of the economic elite in favor 
of Zelaya several months before the ouster when Zelaya decreed an increase in the 
minimum wage. In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, Zelaya, in December of 
that same year, “decreed, among other measures, a 60 percent increase in the minimum 
wage, reaching $290 per month, a sum that barely covered the basic cost of living for a 
family.”245 The economic and business elite in Honduras who, “already feeling 
threatened by unanticipated political and social steps being taken by the formerly 
mainstream president,”246 were furious at the move claiming that the economy would 
collapse under the weight of the new minimum wage.247 After the decree went into 
effect, “the business sector filed numerous appeals to the Supreme Court, on the grounds 
that the wage increase violated their constitutional rights.”248 This move by the Zelaya 
administration gave the court a prime opportunity to demonstrate where it stood 
regarding the President’s ideological stance. Perhaps surprisingly, the court did not 
perform to the liking of the elites. 
In April 2009, just two short months prior to the ouster of President Zelaya, the 
Public Ministry, which is “the legal office of the Honduran government,” recommended 
the court “reject the appeals submitted by employers on the grounds that the wage 
increase did not imply a violation of constitutional rights.”249 Later the same month, the 
Supreme Court “ruled that the increase in the minimum wage ‘is consistent with 
constitutional rights and therefore stands.’”250 The court sided with Zelaya and 
reaffirmed his legal ability to raise the rate “and that the government must guarantee fair 
remuneration.”251 Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle of the left leaning NACLA Report on the  
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Americas claimed the minimum wage move by Zelaya was “the straw that broke the 
camel’s back,”252 which led to his ouster; maybe to the economic elites, but not the 
Supreme Court. Furthermore, it appears that congress was waiting for the court’s decision 
on the minimum wage prior to any action on the issue. After the court voted in favor of 
Zelaya, Micheletti introduced into the congress a decree “aimed at instituting the fifteenth 
month’s wages for the working class, which [would] be paid in the month of March each 
year.”253 Zelaya described the measure as a populist policy and further “asserted that his 
decision to raise the minimum wage truly benefit[ed] the poor because the poorest sectors 
earn the minimum wage.”254 Even so, the newly proposed salary would not have gone 
into effect until March 2010.255 Given these facts, the analysis of the minimum wage 
issue is based on partial evidence, as it is not known how the congress felt about the 
minimum wage issue from December 2008 to April 2009. Although, it does not appear 
that they had an issue with it since they made no rebuttal.  
Certainly, no doubt exists that the Honduran Supreme Court was highly 
politicized. Yet, given all the aforementioned research, it does seem that ultimately the 
court was responding in kind with the other branches to the elite’s fears of Zelaya’s 
alleged attempt at reelection. As Chapter II stated, Zelaya was undoubtedly moving his 
ideology and policies toward alignment with Chávez and the new left in Latin America. 
For the court, their “straw” did not come until the “Chief Prosecutor asked the Supreme 
Court to arrest Zelaya, accusing him of multiple crimes. The Court appointed one of its 
justices to hear the process in its preparatory and intermediate phases; that justice issued  
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an arrest warrant.”256 Zelaya’s alleged reelection referendum was ruled unconstitutional 
and the President was ordered detained for his illegal actions—the courts had thus 
claimed their seat on the bandwagon. 
E. THE COURT’S TIMELINE AND RULINGS 
The court’s involvement in the incident began in May 2009, almost two months 
after Zelaya’s decree ordering the referendum was issued. The Law Library of Congress 
issued a report detailing the events and legal proceedings that followed the court’s 
involvement. This section summarizes the findings of the report. “On May 8, 2009, the 
Chief Prosecutor, acting as guarantor of the Constitution, filed a law suit before the Court 
of Administrative Litigation [CAL] requesting that the Court declare the illegality and 
nullity of the administrative act carried out by the Executive Branch under the Executive 
Decree.”257 Realizing that resistance was mounting, Zelaya changed the order, rescinded 
the previous decree, and ordered the nonbinding poll on May 26, 2009.258 One day later, 
the CAL “ordered the president to suspend the public consultation.”259 On May 29, 2009, 
Zelaya “issued Executive Accord No. 027-2009, by which he ordered that a national 
public opinion poll be carried out by the National Institute of Statistics [INE]” with the 
assistance of the military.260 “On June 3, the [CAL] issued the first judicial 
communication . . . asking the President to abide by the Court’s ruling.”261 Zelaya 
rejected the request and filed an appeal that was ruled inadmissible by the Court of 
Appeals for Administrative Disputes on June 16, 2009.262 “On June 19, the [CAL] issued 
a second judicial notification . . . requesting that [Zelaya] abstain from conducting any 
kind of public consultation that might violate the Court’s rulings of May 27 and May 
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29.”263 Furthermore, the CAL informed Zelaya through judicial notification that he had 
five days to notify the court of what actions he intended to take or comply with the 
court’s order: “No answer was received.”264  
The charges filed against Zelaya by the Chief Prosecutor on June 26, 2009, listed 
“crimes of acting against the established form of government, treason against the country, 
abuse of authority, and usurpation of functions.”265 At that point, the Supreme Court 
“unanimously voted to appoint one of its Justices to hear the process in its preparatory 
and intermediate phases; that Justice carried out the request, issuing an arrest and raid 
warrant. Two days later . . . Zelaya was arrested.”266 The Supreme Court had the 
constitutional authority to order the armed forces to act on the arrest warrant; yet, the 
military had no constitutional or legal authority to expatriate Zelaya because “under the 
Honduran Constitution, ‘[n]o Honduran may be expatriated nor handed over to the 
authorities of a foreign State.’”267 According to the Law Library of Congress, the judicial 
branch “applied constitutional and statutory law in the case against President Zelaya in a 
manner that was judged by the Honduran authorities from both branches of the 
government to be in accordance with the Honduran legal system.”268  
Responding to a question from a journalist in a report published on July 16, 2009 
by La Tribuna Online, Honduran Supreme Court Chief Justice Jorge Alberto Rivera 
Aviles would not indicate whether the military’s actions were illegal. The journalist 
asked, “What the Armed Forces did, when they expelled [Zelaya], was it illegal?”269 The 
Chief Justice responded by saying:  
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It will be necessary to establish the state of need from that point of view; 
states of need involve protecting the life of the citizen who is being 
arrested and preventing bloodshed among the citizens of a country; all this 
will have to be assessed later on, once the courts of the republic 
investigate the case. Personally, I cannot issue a statement in this concern 
because, as head of a State Branch, I am sure that I will have to investigate 
those actions in the future.270  
The Chief Justice claimed that the state of need can be invoked “when it is determined 
that an action is advisable for the nation’s interests” but that ultimately the issue would 
have to be “analyzed in due time.”271 This justification by the court mirrored the 
military’s reasoning for their actions that is further discussed in Chapter IV. The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2012 report noted, “the political crisis of 
2009 was an important test for the ability of the judiciary to prosecute abuse of public 
office, with mixed results,” by stating that “the courts were able to prosecute abuses of 
authority allegedly perpetrated by Zelaya and other officials.”272 Yet, the study then 
points out that “those public officials (i.e., military officials and perhaps also top 
politicians and judges) guilty of sending Zelaya into exile—a clear violation of the 
constitution—were acquitted by the courts”273 once the aforementioned “due time” had 
elapsed. Furthermore, it cites “the government’s explanation for such inconsistency is 
that political offenses that occurred during the crisis (i.e., violations of constitutional 
provisions) are covered under a political amnesty granted by Congress, but criminal 
offenses (i.e., Zelaya’s corruption charges) are not.”274 Overall, it is clear that while the 
court’s actions were legal, they were undoubtedly protecting the elites at the center of the 
crisis. 
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F. THEORETICAL SUPPORT 
Given the information above, the question regarding theoretical framework 
application can be answered. Do Helmke, Hilbink, or Stanton provide any theoretical 
framework or guidance that would point to an explanation behind the court’s actions? 
Overall, Helmke’s argument does not apply to the Honduran incident; however, the 
evidence uncovered neither rules her argument applicable or not applicable to this case. If 
Helmke’s argument applies to the Honduran incident, then the newly instituted Supreme 
Court that arguably lacked security and institutional strength should have ruled against 
Zelaya in the minimum wage incident—a ruling that could have been in favor of the 
congress that appointed them, albeit its stance on the issue during the ruling is not known. 
Or, a ruling in favor of the economic and business elite combined with the alignment 
against him in June would speak volumes to her argument: the newly appointed and weak 
court saw the end was near for Zelaya, and thus, a decision to rule against him in favor of 
the incoming government could help them keep their jobs in the new administration. 
Considering the research presented above, the June decision was simply a move in 
conjunction with the rest of the elites in Honduras, which strengthens their standing 
among the powerful. Even so, given this information, a claim cannot be made on 
Helmke’s theory because of the inability to determine either way how her theory would 
explain the court’s involvement. 
Lisa Hilbink’s theoretical framework does not answer the question either, 
although her argument does predict that the court would be politicized. Hilbink says that 
the structural hierarchy of the judicial system that promoted from within yielded 
conservative judges independent and apolitical from exogenous forces, which is clearly 
not the case in Honduras. Therefore, given that Honduras’s Supreme Court stands in 
complete contrast to Hilbink’s argument, this thesis posits that she predicts this type of 
political court. The Supreme Court was institutionally weak and highly politicized with 
no hierarchical structure in place to protect it. Therefore, the court did not have the 
insulation that Hilbink says prevents politicization. The court was politicized because of 
its actual and admitted influence of the political parties and congress. The Honduran 
Supreme Court, however, does resemble the Chilean Supreme Court of the late 1890s to 
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mid-1920s. Hilbink notes that during this period, Chile was a “parliamentary republic,” 
which means “constitutional practices and interpretations produced the hegemony of the 
Congress, rendering constitutional amendment unnecessary.”275 Under this system, 
which was similar to that of Honduras in 2009, the “‘allegiance of judges was given to 
the political parties to which they owed their appointments, just as it had formerly been 
given to the chief executive in the preceding period.’”276 Even though this allegiance is 
not Hilbink’s complete argument, her framework still applies because essentially, if 
judges do not have the structural insulation to protect them from politicization, then they 
will become political—and no doubt exists that this statement describes the nature of the 
Honduran Supreme Court. 
Finally, besides general political alliances the justices had with the political 
parties, some evidence does appear to be available that Jeffrey Staton’s public opinion 
theory is applicable to the court’s involvement. “In the two months preceding June 28 . . . 
support for the fourth ballot box dropped from 80 percent to 60 percent.”277 Even though 
each of these numbers represents a majority, it does nonetheless appear that public 
opinion was declining, and therefore, the courts could have seen their involvement in 
some way as beneficial and potentially supported by the public. The Latin American 
Public Opinion Project, however, conducted a survey of the Honduran people in 2010 in 
which it found that 58.3 percent of the populace did not favor the removal of President 
Zelaya from office.278 Perhaps more strikingly, 61.1 percent of Hondurans felt the 
removal was in fact a coup d’état.279 Given these numbers, it is conceivable that Staton’s 
argument has some weight in the Honduran case, but the high numbers are still 
encompass a majority, and thus, should not be relied on as the sole reason the court 
became involved. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
“Honduras’s constitution is less than 30 years old. Reforms to enhance 
representation in Congress and create judicial independence are less than a decade 
old.”280 Thus, it is no surprise that this politicized and weak Court joined the anti-Zelaya 
chorus in June 2009. Once again, it seems that reelection was the real problem as the 
ruling in favor of the minimum wage decree indicated. Once the reelection infection hit 
the marble steps of the Court’s front door, it fiercely fought against Zelaya and supported 
the illegal actions of the military, which is evidenced by the Courts’ actions regarding the 
firing of General Vásquez by Zelaya: After immediately reinstating the former to his 
post, the Supreme Court justified its actions by “arguing that a 2001 law governing the 
armed forces barred the president from dismissing the military chief without legal cause 
despite the chief executive’s apparent constitutional authority . . . to replace the top 
officer ‘freely.’”281 Furthermore, Supreme Court Justice Rosalinda Cruz “said the 
removal was not a coup because the military was acting under court orders that were the 
result of a unanimous decision by the fifteen justices on the court” and that “the 
military’s decision to send Mr. Zelaya out of the country was a safety measure to prevent 
the spread of violence and riots that would result had he been detained for trial.”282 As 
the Honduran political scene hurtled towards June 28, the Court was clearly responding 
to elitist fears of Zelaya’s alleged “continuismo”—even to the point of defending the 
illegal actions of a military that thrived on its ability to protect its homeland from the 
threat of the left. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL HONDURAN MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Like so many other Latin American nations, Honduras was not immune to the 
military coups and governments of the mid-twentieth century. Between the 1960s and 
early 1980s, generals or a group of army personnel in a military junta governed 
Honduras. Obviously, military governments are political; although, as was demonstrated 
in Chapter I, the theme in Latin America from the 1980s onward was that militaries, once 
they returned to the barracks, no longer engaged in politics as they did in the past. This 
chapter, however, provides evidence into the modern legacy of the politicized Honduran 
military. The armed forces in Honduras have been a dominant power in politics since the 
1950s. Specifically, the military ruled the government from 1963 to 1982, until the 
transfer back to democratic rule.283 This chapter reveals a deep-seated hatred of leftist 
political ideology that contributed to motive for involvement by the armed forces, and 
provides insight into the military’s decision-making process to expatriate Zelaya. The 
main factor that contributed to the military’s decision resembled not modern day theories 
of civil-military relations; rather, the military exemplifies Alfred Stepan’s 1973 theory of 
new professionalism because the coup leaders felt Zelaya and his leftist allies and 
supporters posed, to some degree, an insurgent threat to the security of the state. Also, the 
evidence is supported by Loveman’s 1996 and Huntington’s 1968 arguments previously 
mentioned in Chapter I. This chapter also demonstrates that because of the United States’ 
historical involvement in supporting the Honduran military, the coup leaders could have 
considered possible American responses, such as economic reprisals or military 
intervention, to their actions, as evidenced by Kirk S. Bowman’s militarization argument. 
In arresting Zelaya and expatriating him from the country fueled by their hatred of the 
left and fear of an insurgent threat to the state, the Honduran military was acting not in 
accordance with the more modern theories of Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, but rather the 
Stepan, Loveman, and Huntington’s arguments of the past.  
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B. HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL HONDURAN MILITARY 
Understanding the history of the Honduran military is necessary before explaining 
their role in the events of June 2009. Bowman notes, “Honduras did not have 
institutionalized and professional armed forces until the 1950s.”284 Furthermore, he 
points out, “in Honduran newspapers before 1954, it is difficult to find any mention 
whatsoever of the military.”285 The professionalization of Honduras’ military began with 
the establishment of the Escuela Militar Francisco Morazán in 1952, with the help of the 
United States.286 The school offered “diverse courses of information and capacitation 
[that] were organized in which the officers received many teachings on modern war, 
unifying doctrines and knowledge.”287 Two years later, Honduras had a “strong military 
institution”288 and “declared its first organic law, which defined its mission as the 
defense of national sovereignty and public order.”289 The military’s first foray into 
national politics came in a situation strikingly similar to that of its involvement in the 
Zelaya case. In 1956, after the widely disliked and authoritarian Vice President Julio 
Lozano came to power, he shut down the National Congress and formed his own political 
party—actions that resulted in his ouster by the military.290 The armed forces governed in 
a junta and for 15 months controlled the country until elections were held in 1957 to 
return civilian rule back to Tegucigalpa.291  
The Honduran military handed back the reigns of the executive under several 
conditions, one of which was that the “constitution expanded their mission by officially 
designating the military as guarantors of the electoral process and executive 
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succession.”292 This prerogative arguably strengthened the military’s strong foothold in 
the national political arena. The armed forces invoked this new constitutional privilege in 
1963 when they prevented the election of the left leaning Liberal candidate Modesto 
Rodas Alvarado. Rodas claimed that if he were elected “he would terminate the 
autonomy of the armed forces.”293 Taylor-Robinson and Ura note that because of the 
“heated era of the Cold War in the midst of the Central American crisis, the Honduran 
military could credibly claim that national security necessitated a powerful and 
autonomous military.”294 Rodas’ threats of terminating the military’s autonomy were 
only one element of its hatred for him. Author Marcos Cáceres di Iorio claimed that Mr. 
Rodas’ threats “scared the military so much that some of its brass felt they had to act” 
because “he was considered to be far too much of a political leftist at a time when there 
was elevated fear of communism in Latin America.”295 Thus, the military had to prevent 
him from coming to power—a clearly political move.  
The coup that prevented the election of Rodas placed the military in the 
presidential palace for decades. No longer could it allow civilian leaders to threaten the 
state or themselves as an institution. Bowman states, “the 1963 coup finalized the assent 
of the Honduran armed forces as the dominant political actor in the country.”296 From 
1963 to the late 1970s, different leaders within the Honduran armed forces ruled the 
country. Their reign, however, would begin to falter in 1978 because “the military had 
lost much of its popular following, including that of its private sector allies, who were 
disillusioned by its economic mismanagement and corruption.”297 Furthermore, “in 1979, 
the United States intensified its efforts to persuade the armed forces to leave power 
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peacefully by offering to increase military aid as an inducement.”298 Thus, the 1980s 
brought about the end of the military governments. 
Elections for a constituent assembly were held in 1980, and won by the Liberal 
party.299 The military was not prepared, however, to completely relinquish all control 
over the government, as its second handoff to civilian rule was once again conditional in 
that “military officials made certain that the new constitution would continue to guarantee 
their political and institutional autonomy.”300 Finally, in 1982, Hondurans elected 
Roberto Suazo Córdova as the new president. Even so, the military remained heavily 
involved in politics, and ultimately, dominated the scene.301 Ruhl notes that “although 
civilians were allowed to take charge of most non-security-related policymaking, in many 
ways the armed forces grew even stronger under the new [democratic] regime.”302 This 
fact can be attributed to the accelerated influence of the United States on the Honduran 
military. “Under the Reagan administration, military aid from the United States soared—
from $3.9 million in 1980 to $77.5 million in 1984—in exchange for Honduran 
cooperation during the Contra war against Nicaragua and the counterinsurgency effort in 
El Salvador.”303 
Throughout the 1980s, financial aid from America to Honduras would only 
increase, rising to $81.1 million in 1986 as the armed forces grew to 26,000 in personnel 
and “continued to improve their professional capabilities via intensive U.S. training and 
dozens of joint exercises.”304 Growing in strength both financially and materially, the 
military continued to exert its political arm in government as policies were basically 
formulated and instituted by whatever agreement military leaders and the U.S. embassy 
came to, which was leaving the democratically elected executive and legislative branches 
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to play only a minor role in policy making.305 At the end of the 1980s, “Honduras ha[d] 
become . . . a government that [was] nominally democratic but actually [was] under 
military domination.”306 The 1990s, however, would not be so kind to the Honduran 
armed forces. 
The landscape of government and politics vis-à-vis the military in Honduras 
changed with the new global political climate of the 1990s: the end of the Cold War. Its 
termination left the Honduran military in a weakened state that allowed civilian 
politicians to seize political and institutional control. “The end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of communism removed the principal threats to national security, internal and 
external, which had served to justify the military’s power and existence.”307 Furthermore, 
given that the threat of the spread of communism no longer existed in Central America, 
the United States began to change its view of the Honduran armed forces, and began to 
see them “as little more than a corrupt, expensive obstacle to the consolidation of 
democracy.”308 As a result, the military began to lose influence within the two traditional 
political parties.309 All these factors combined began to strengthen civil-military 
relations, and ultimately, civilian control of the military in Honduras while eroding the 
military’s political influence. 
Despite the loss in political influence among the parties, President Rafael 
Leonardo Callejas of the National Party, which historically aligned with the military, did 
not attempt to subordinate the armed forces or its influence.310 Rather, America exerted 
the most force on the military’s decline. “Beginning in 1990, the United States began to 
make drastic cuts in its aid to the Honduran military, which caused its resources to drop 
precipitously: from a still sizable $41.1 million in 1989 to a bare $2.7 million by 
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1993.”311 Civil society and the media began to put pressure on government officials to 
hold the armed forces accountable for past human rights abuses, which further erodes the 
influence of the military.312 The first major move to place the military totally under 
civilian rule because of its declining influence came under Liberal President Carlos 
Roberta Reina. In 1994 and 1995, over the objection of the military, “the constitution was 
amended and the military was brought under civilian control [insofar as civilian leaders 
exercised greater control over the military than before], mandatory military service was 
ended, and the police were removed from the military.”313 Yet perhaps, more damning 
was that “military aid from the United States dwindled to a paltry $500,000 in 1994 and 
then dropped further, to only $325,000, in 1995.”314 The descent of the military’s 
influential power would intensify under Reina’s successor. 
Along with President Reina, Liberal President Carlos Flores Facussé “shrank the 
military by more than half and took away most of its powers and prerogatives.”315 
President Facussé’s greatest achievement was “a landmark constitutional reform in 1999 
[that] legally established civilian supremacy over the military for the first time since the 
1950s.”316 One critical change in this reform was the establishment of a civilian defense 
minister with complete legitimate legality.317 President Facussé “demonstrated his 
authority . . . when in 1999 he dismissed [the] uniformed commander and most of the 
army’s top echelon after senior officers clashed with the new civilian defense minister 
over personnel issues.”318 The action caused the military to threaten rebellion but 
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ultimately, “divisions within the officer corps combined with strong support from . . . the 
United States and the business community enabled [Facussé] to dismiss the recalcitrant 
elements and significantly strengthened civilian authority over the military.”319 As a 
result, in the years of National President Ricardo Rodolfo Maduro, 2002 to 2006, civilian 
control of the military in Honduras rapidly strengthened and the country was “developing 
a relatively stable model of civil-military relations.”320 This model, however, would be 
shaken to the core over the coming years. 
As Chapter I mentioned, President Zelaya had very cozy relations with the 
Honduran military. Furthermore, he seemed to esteem future coup leader General Romeo 
Vásquez Velásquez and demonstrated it by “reappointing him to an unusual second three-
year term as chief of the Joint General Staff.”321 Relations between Zelaya and the 
military establishment were so good that one author noted in a column for Revista Envio, 
“since the return to civilian rule in 1980, no Honduran leader has helped elevate the 
military’s profile as much as Mel Zelaya during his three years in office.”322 Even though 
di Iorio notes that the military had spent “much time, effort and financial capital” over the 
transition to democracy in branding themselves as apolitical and neutral from the political 
sphere,323 it appears that President Zelaya may have encouraged a break from this 
supposed political indifference for his own personal gain. The most important element of 
Zelaya’s support of the military was apparently politically motivated: Zelaya 
“encouraged the army’s hierarchy to abandon its neutrality—which had cost so much to 
achieve—so it would express partisan opinions in favor of the [Law of Citizen 
Participation],”324 the first major legislative achievement of his presidency. This political 
encouraging backfired on Zelaya as is evidenced by the military’s political role in the 
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coup. By encouraging their reengagement in politics, Zelaya, perhaps unintentionally, 
permitted the military’s return to its days of political influence. 
C. THE IDEOLOGICAL HATRED OF THE LEFT 
As Chapter II demonstrated, Honduran politics has no taste for leftist, particularly 
the new left, ideology. In this regard, the military is no different. The military coup 
leadership did not just suddenly despise Zelaya’s leftist political ideology. In fact, it 
appears that the military institution has detested the left since before the return to 
democracy. It is imperative to point out that Modesto Rodas, the aforementioned leftist 
candidate that the military would not allow to be elected, was the father of Patricia 
Rodas, the leftist ideological leader for Zelaya, and one of his closest confidants,325 
which the research indicates is the first instance of outward leftist hatred by the Honduran 
military. Furthermore, Ruhl, Taylor-Robinson, and Ura all indicate that senior military 
officers had been “politically socialized” by and “steeped in Cold War ideology” that 
certainly was evident in the 1960s regarding their actions towards Rodas.326 Following 
the Rodas incident, the country was ruled by “General of the Air Force Oswaldo López 
Arellano in collaboration with the National party.”327 López, however, came under great 
“pressure from a combination of organized labor and progressive business groups” that 
eventually led him to depose his corrupt government in favor of a more “populist, 
nationalist program that expanded the role of the state and instituted an important 
agrarian reform” that catered to “reformist labor, private sector, and peasant” groups.328 
This shift represents a move to the new populist left and did not marry with his fellow 
generals. López was deposed by the conservative Colonel (soon to be General) Juan 
Melgar Castro in 1975. The conservative military elites would not tolerate any inkling of 
leftist ideologies infiltrating their ranks. 
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Research indicates that this trend continued in the 1980s with then Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez. The General, who had 
fought in the Argentine Dirty War in which he battled to purge the country of 
communists during the 1980s under the presidency of Suazo Córdova, used this 
experience “to ferret out all left leaning, real or imagined, individuals and groups in 
Honduras” during the Central American conflicts.329 Author Thomas Leonard posits, 
“the perception of a genuine leftist threat to Honduran stability enhanced Alvarez’s 
political image at home and with U.S. policymakers.”330 Perhaps, the Honduran general 
saw political capital in standing against leftist ideology.  
The leftist hatred did not die when General Alvarez was no longer in power. 
Rather, during the presidency of Liberal José Azcona (1986–1990), the military pushed 
against supposed leftist leaders. Under the leadership of General Humberto Regalado 
Hernández, “the military high command demonstrated its influence over Azcona by 
vetoing his choice for foreign minister, [future President Reina], on the grounds of his 
suspected Leftist leanings.”331 Furthermore, as with many other Latin American 
countries under military rule, the Honduran military was accused of human rights 
violations, specifically towards left leaning groups.332 These examples of foundational 
leftist hatred point to the reason why when Zelaya aligned himself with the younger 
Rodas, and as a result, Chávez, the depth of the military’s fear of the left resurfaced as 
vehemently as it did. Even so, it seems unlikely that the military would go so far as to 
break the law by expatriating Zelaya based solely on his leftist ideology. For a complete 
explanation, this thesis posits that a return to Alfred Stepan’s new professionalism is 
necessary. 
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D. ENDURING NEW PROFESSIONALISM WITHIN THE HONDURAN 
MILITARY 
Chapter I discussed relevant arguments in modern day civil-military relations. Yet 
those arguments failed to predict or explain the military’s behavior in the Zelaya incident; 
thus, this section argues that the explanation of the military’s involvement is found in an 
older theory of civil-military relations. In his 1973 work entitled, “The New 
Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” Alfred Stepan argued 
that changing economic and political factors in Latin America were viewed by the 
military as an internal threat to the state, and therefore, focusing on politics and 
economics was a means to neutralize the threat; thus, creating a “new 
professionalism.”333 He noted the “process by which the military came to define its 
mission primarily in terms of dealing with threats to internal security was accelerated by 
the defeat and destruction of the conventional army in Cuba by Castro’s guerilla 
force.”334 Thus, “military institutions began to study such questions as the social and 
political conditions facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and to develop 
doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements.”335 As a 
result, the military became highly political as its educational institutions began to “train 
their officers to acquire expertise in internal security matters that were defined as 
embracing all aspects of social, economic, and political life.”336  
In his empirical cases of Brazil and Peru, Stepan noted that both countries’ war 
colleges focused their studies on the “process of military role expansion” because “staff 
and students at the war colleges attempted to systematically diagnose their nation’s 
security-development situation.”337 Thus, in Brazil, “the new professionalism of internal 
warfare and national development contributed to the expansion of the military’s role,” 
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and ultimately led “to the military’s assumption of power in 1964.”338 In Peru, “officers 
feared that the country could evolve into a dangerous state of insecurity if fundamental 
changes in the polity and economy were not brought about,” and believed their “training 
in the new professionalism gave them the trained cadres and correct ideology for the task 
of restructuring the country.”339 In both cases, the militaries viewed the political and 
economic situations in their countries as posing a serious internal security threat that they 
felt responsible for handling, and thus, were motivated to engage and neutralize the threat 
by taking power of the government. Ultimately, Stepan argues that militaries viewed the 
dismal political and economic situations along with a rising threat of insurgency as 
posing a serious internal security threat that they felt responsible for handling, and thus, 
were motivated to engage and neutralize the threat by taking control of the government. 
The argument highlights the military’s motive in deciding to intervene—combating 
threats and protecting the homeland. In Honduras, scholars have noted, “the military 
essentially confines its spheres of influence to national security and internal stability.”340 
Thus, while the Honduran military did not take over the government in the Zelaya case, 
in the present Latin American and global context that favors democracy, Stepan’s 
argument was clearly empirically evidenced by the actions and reasoning of the 
Honduran generals as shown in the rest of this section. 
One example of a brewing insurgency that posed a threat to the state occurred in 
the weeks prior to the coup. After the Honduran Attorney General declared he would 
enforce the illegality of Zelaya’s proposed referenda, “some 100 agitators, wielding 
machetes, descended on the attorney general’s office. ‘We have come to defend this 
country’s second founding,’ the group’s leader reportedly said. ‘If we are denied it, we 
will resort to national insurrection.’”341 This type of insurgent activity is similar to what 
Stepan argued the military would use as a catalyst for political intervention and a 
response to this threat is consistent with the military’s aforementioned mission. Thus, an 
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apparent insurgency was growing out of an assault on the justice system to an eventual 
confrontation with the military itself as Zelaya along with his supporters took matters into 
their own hands. 
Even though President Zelaya was perfectly within his constitutional right, under 
Article 277, to order the military to provide for the security and facilitation of the 
referenda,342 the Honduran military “[had] a constitutional obligation under Articles 272 
and 278 to disobey illegal or unconstitutional orders.”343 The referenda materials, 
produced and paid for by Chávez’s government, were being held at a facility at an air 
base in the capitol of Tegucigalpa. To ensure his referendum would proceed as 
scheduled, Zelaya led a group of supporters to the airbase to retrieve the materials. “They 
were met at the gate by General Luis Prince, who commanded the base. Mr. Zelaya told 
General Prince that he had come to retrieve the thousands of boxes of ballots for the 
scheduled opinion poll that Sunday.”344 The general was placed in a precarious position. 
The military had orders to “guard the warehouse and block access to the boxes” because 
the supplies had been “ordered impounded by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.”345 Yet 
face to face with his Commander in Chief backed by a mob of supporters, the general 
allowed Zelaya and his crowd to take possession of the election materials.346 Using his 
supporters as “human shields,” Zelaya exclaimed to TV cameras that he was “simply 
carrying out the will of the people and that no mere magistrate was going to prevent him 
from completing his mission.”347 This incident, along with those above, indicate that at 
least in the military’s mind, evidence of some degree of insurgency was brewing that 
could pose a threat to the state, which further supported Stepan’s argument. 
As a result of the President and his supporter’s actions, the political elites along 
with the military were “worried that if [Zelaya] stayed in the country after his arrest his 
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supporters would foment violence to try to bring down the interim government and 
restore him to power.”348 Arresting Zelaya was not enough; the military determined that 
it had to break the law willfully by expatriating Zelaya; thus, “the soldiers exceeded 
judicial instructions and violated Zelaya’s constitutional rights under Article 102 by 
exiling him instead of bringing him before a judge as required by law.”349 The military 
was not naïve; they were fully aware that their decision to send Zelaya to Costa Rica was 
illegal.350 Unashamed of their actions, numerous members of the military gave similar 
answers as to why they disobeyed the court’s order—answers that point to Stepan’s 1973 
argument. “A military spokesman claimed that the armed forces took this step to prevent 
a [future] violent confrontation with Zelaya’s supporters.”351 The Army’s attorney, 
Colonel Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, said, “had Zelaya been jailed, throngs of loyal 
followers would have erupted into chaos and demanded his release with violence.”352 He 
added that had they not expatriated Zelaya, the army would have been “burying a pile of 
people.”353 As well, Inestroza admitted that “after 34 years in the military . . . he’d have a 
hard time taking orders from a leftist,” adding further that having previously fought 
insurgent movements in the past, Honduras was “the only country that did not have a 
fratricidal war like the others;” thus, Inestroza mentioned, “‘it would be difficult for us, 
with our training, to have a relationship with a leftist government.’”354 Furthermore, the 
military knew it would be exonerated for any illegal involvement as Article 24 of 
Honduras’ penal code “allows for making tough decisions based on the good of the 
state.”355 In this reasoning, the military arguably communicated a fear of an insurgent 
threat. 
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The Honduran generals did not need a lawyer to justify their actions—they were 
pleased to do it publicly themselves. Belen Fernandez of the publication Counterpunch 
conducted an interview with General Vásquez in November 2009 in which the General 
revealed his rationale behind the decision. Arguably giving the politically and legally 
correct answer, the General stated, “the refusal of the military to follow Zelaya’s orders . 
. . was ‘not because the armed forces didn’t want to carry out the mission but rather that 
we simply couldn’t because we had to uphold the rule of law.’”356 Yet, Ruhl stated that 
“after seeking the advice of military and civilian legal experts, General Vásquez warned 
Zelaya in late April that he should refrain from instructing the military to provide 
logistical support to the disputed referendum,”357 rather than telling Zelaya out right that 
it would be illegal for him to do so. Providing insight into the expatriation decision, the 
General stated further on in the interview that if the they had not expatriated the president 
“‘he would have been taken to a military facility . . . and his followers would have gone 
to take him out of there just as they did at the Air Force base . . . which could have caused 
a lot of deaths, including [Zelaya’s] own.’”358 Additionally, in August 2009, an army 
commander was quoted by CNN as having “announced that the Honduran military had 
succeeded in halting the spread of socialism” with Zelaya’s ouster.359  
The generals, along with Vásquez, took to the media to explain their involvement 
later in August 2009 on the Honduran program “Face to Face.” On national television, 
the generals explained “in language that often veered into confessional . . . that they did 
not act to take sides in the political fights that had polarized the country, but out of 
obedience to the law,” a clear contradiction of previous statements and actions made by 
the leaders.360 “The more they spoke, however, the more they showed how concerned 
they were that their image had been damaged by their actions, and the clearer it became 
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that they continued to play a leading role in Honduran politics.”361 The generals defended 
their actions as necessary to preserve the integrity and validity of the constitution 
President Zelaya was allegedly attempting to undermine.362 Not surprisingly, “the 
generals said that . . . Mr. Zelaya . . . had become a threat to Honduran democracy, not 
only because he had disobeyed court orders, but also because he had allied Honduras 
with [Chávez].”363 Overall, the Honduran military undoubtedly felt that Zelaya’s actions, 
his aggressive leftist ideology, an unstable political environment, and the insurgent 
characteristics of his supporters were a threat to the state that had to be neutralized as 
Stepan predicted—even if it meant breaking the law. 
In addition to Stepan’s argument, the Honduran military’s actions can also be 
explained by the 1999 writing of Brian Loveman. The author posits, “defending la patria 
(the nation, or fatherland) against internal and external threats is the historical mission 
claimed by Latin American armed forces”364 that has lived on to the post-Cold War, 
democratic context. Loveman explains that military’s and their civilian counterparts 
“usually justify their apparent breach of discipline and subordination to civilian authority 
as response to government illegitimacy and inefficacy that imperil la patria, not as claims 
that the armed forces have permanently assumed the role of sovereign.”365 The author’s 
argument is clearly demonstrated by the empirical evidence presented above because he 
notes, there is general consensus among military elites that defending their nation against 
external and internal enemies is their primordial historical mission.”366 This mission is 
“legitimated by tradition, by historical myths, and by professional education for officers 
in military schools and academies.”367  
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Finally, Samuel Huntington’s weak institutions argument is clearly evidenced by 
the research presented in this and the preceding chapters. Huntington claims that military 
intervention into politics, specifically by way of a coup, is “only one specific 
manifestation of a broader phenomenon in undeveloped societies: the general 
politicization of social forces and institutions.”368 These undeveloped societies are 
praetorian in nature where politicization originates from “the absence of effective 
political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political 
action,”369 which, in turn, creates weak institutions that were clearly present in Honduras 
during the crisis. For Huntington, “the weakness of political institutions means that 
authority and office are easily acquired and easily lost.”370 While the military did not 
control power once Zelaya was removed, it is not inconceivable to see how it seized on 
the lack of institutional strength and extreme politicization and took matters into its own 
hands as evidenced by its actions specifically regarding expatriation. Thus, as Huntington 
predicts, when weak institutions and extreme politicization abound in praetorian societies 
like Honduras, the military is likely to involve itself in governmental affairs—even if that 
leads to a coup. The Honduran military’s political history, hatred of the ideological left, 
and actions regarding the removal and expatriation of President Zelaya thus can be 
explained by the theories of Alfred Stepan, Brian Loveman, and Samuel Huntington.  
E. U.S. INTERVENTION? 
Still, one more factor arguably remained in the military’s calculus—what would 
be the reaction of the United States? Given the previously described historical importance 
of the United States to the Honduran army, and the hegemonic superiority of Central 
America’s northern neighbor, it is not inconceivable to think that the generals would have 
considered what, if any, response America would have to their actions. In fact, according 
to officials within the administration of President Barack Obama, “U.S. officials were 
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talking to the Honduran military right up to the day of the coup.”371 Evidence suggests 
that the Honduran generals may not have feared any reprisal from the United States 
because America could thank the generals for helping it in the fight against Chavismo.372 
Army General Miguel Ángel García Padgett claimed that “socialism, communism, 
Chávismo,”373 which indicated the words all held the same meaning, “disguised as 
democracy had up until June 28 been en route to the ‘heart of the United States,’ which 
he declared already had enough to deal with given organized crime and narcotrafficking 
problems on the U.S.-Mexican border.”374 Arguably, the Honduran military believed that 
America would appreciate the disruption of the spread of Chávez’s influence regardless 
of whether or not laws were broken in doing so. General Vásquez, however, denied the 
move as one designed to help the United States.375 Even so, it does seem that the generals 
could have been weighing an American response in the course of their own decision-
making process. 
Furthermore, the Honduran generals could have reasoned it was unlikely that their 
actions would have been followed up by an U.S. military invasion of Honduras to 
reestablish order. American military intervention would not have been a “viable option” 
given the history of U.S. military involvement in the region.376 “Moreover, it would be 
illogical [for U.S. military forces] to forcibly reinstate a less than democratic leader with 
anti-U.S. tendencies.”377 Perhaps, the Honduran generals knew this would be the 
American response, and thus, their illegal actions would not succumb to retaliation. 
Following the coup, even though the United States and the greater international 
community condemned the events in Honduras, and supported Zelaya’s reinstatement as 
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the constitutionally elected president, America “never used its biggest stick—trade 
sanctions—and ultimately wavered in its commitment to Zelaya.”378 Given that the 
United States could have intervened militarily or economically, it is possible to believe 
that the generals may have had some form of confidence that America would not impose 
retribution, and thus, proceeded on with their plan. 
Kirk Bowman’s 2002 book, Militarizatoin, Democracy, and Development: The 
Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America, seems to be somewhat relevant to the 
Honduran generals calculus as well. The author assesses the impact of militarization, 
which he defines as “military size and budgets,” against “three separate indicators of 
development—democracy, economic growth, and equity.”379 Using an empirical study of 
the Honduran military from its professional inception in the 1950s to its time in the 
presidential palace in the 1960s, Bowman found that increased levels of militarization 
resulted in coups against democracy, and thus concluded that overall “where 
militarization was strong in Latin America during the Cold War era, sudden declines of 
democracy result[ed].”380 The key to militarization in Honduras was the influence of the 
United States, leaving Bowman to conclude that Honduras “demonstrates how a near 
nonexistent military institution could grow with U.S. support into the arbiter of national 
politics in a very short period of time.”381 The author notes that the United States was not 
always an approving ally of the military as is evidenced by the reaction America had to 
the coup led by the aforementioned López Arellano. In response, “the United States 
immediately withdrew diplomatic recognition.”382 The outcome of this reaction is what 
reveals a similarity to the case at hand. 
The Honduran generals of the 1963 coup did not worry about the United States’ 
withdrawal of support, because they knew the “threat was hollow.”383 Latin American 
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military coups were occurring all over the region in the 1960s throughout Central and 
South America and the U.S. response pattern, as Bowman notes, was predictable: “the 
United States in every case suspended relations, publicly exclaimed support of 
democracy, and then quickly renewed relations with the generals.”384 That situation is 
exactly what materialized as a result of the 1963 coup on December 14, 1963. A few 
months after the coup, America resumed normal relations with the new military 
government.385 Perhaps, the generals of 2009 reflected on this instance and knew that 
despite American disdain for their actions, which is covered in Chapter V, the United 
States would not sustain a hostile relationship for long. Even though U.S. interest in 
Honduras in the 1960s was far greater than in 2009, given the context of the Cold War, it 
is not unreasonable to think that Vásquez and his generals posited the same as Bowman 
did regarding U.S. response; thus, they feared no American reprisal just as the generals of 
old saw none for actions much worse than expatriation and arrest. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided evidence that the military’s long-standing hatred of the 
ideological left and fear of an internal security threat to the state by Zelaya and his 
supporters ultimately led them to obey the orders of the Supreme Court, yet break the law 
by expatriating the President to Costa Rica. Since Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ arguments 
did not predict the military’s behavior, the arguments of Alfred Stepan, Brian Loveman, 
and Samuel Huntington were applied to the case. These arguments clearly support the 
evidence presented and correctly predict the military’s actions. Even though there was 
limited evidence on the lack of potential reprisal from the United States regarding the 
military’s activities, this factor still seems relevant to the military’s decision making 
despite the basis in speculation. Bowman’s militarization argument speaks to the 
historical importance of the U.S. relationship with the Honduran military, and how the 
generals could have considered this factor in 2009. Each factor does not appear to explain 
fully the involvement on its own. Rather, all must be combined together to provide a 
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complete and clear reason as to why the generals broke the law on June 28, 2009. The 
military’s involvement in the Honduran crisis completes the search for an answer to the 
reason behind the removal of President Zelaya. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that the answer to the question of why President Manuel 
Zelaya was deposed as the leader of Honduras contains many different causal factors. 
Chapter II discussed the elements of applicable theoretical models and tested them 
against the evidence surrounding the crisis. It found that Llanos and Marsteinstredet’s 
intra-governmental conflict, Pérez-Liñán’s presidential scandal, and Baumgartner and 
Kada’s party politics links in the causal chain were factors in Zelaya’s removal. Yet, the 
main finding of Chapter II, and the thesis as a whole, was that Zelaya’s shift to the new 
“radical” left in Latin America along with his alleged desire for reelection threatened and 
scared the elites so much that they triggered his ousting, in a context in which elites 
historically have exercised significant direct influence on the Honduran legislature and 
judicial system. Chapter III examined the Supreme Court’s role in Zelaya’s removal, and 
demonstrated it was not until the crisis was in its final months that the court jumped on 
the elite bandwagon and moved to remove Zelaya. Finally, Chapter IV analyzed the 
highly political Honduran military that has a legacy of leftist hatred. The chapter showed 
how Alfred Stepan’s new professionalism argument is still relevant to military politics 
today and was the ultimate motivator for military intervention, even to the point of 
breaking the law. Furthermore, the chapter pointed to the arguments of Brian Loveman 
and Samuel Huntington as further theoretical support for the Honduran military’s actions. 
The current chapter discusses what happened after Zelaya’s removal, provides further 
discussion of the reelection plus new left equation that is the central finding of this thesis, 
and further reviews the institutional response to the elite sentiment in the incident. 
A. THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP 
While President Zelaya was still standing in his pajamas on the tarmac in Costa 
Rica, Roberto Micheletti was busy being sworn in as President of Honduras. Micheletti’s 
dream of occupying the presidential palace in Tegucigalpa had finally materialized; yet, 
his tenure as president would not be a stroll in the park. “The international community 
reacted quickly and forcefully to the events of June 28, 2009” as the European Union and 
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U.N. “condemned the ouster and called for Zelaya’s immediate return, as did every 
regional grouping in the hemisphere.”386 The U.S.’ response was, perhaps as the military 
calculated, not as forceful or immediate as that of the broader international community. 
“On the day of the coup, the White House did not condemn it, instead calling on ‘all 
political and social actors in Honduras’ to respect democracy.”387 Thus, “the Obama 
administration refused to determine that a ‘military coup’ had taken place in 
Honduras.”388 The American response was convoluted, as in some instances, it seemed 
the United States would support Zelaya’s return to power, yet when the former tried to do 
so himself, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “denounced his actions as ‘reckless.’”389 
Perhaps the harshest response came from the OAS, which “on July 4, 2009 . . . 
unanimously voted to suspend Honduras from the organization for an unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order.”390 Furthermore, the newly installed Micheletti 
government was “not recognized by a single country.”391 The pressure was not only felt 
in the political sphere: The economic coffers of Honduras took a major hit as nations 
throughout Central America, the European Union, the United States, and Venezuela 
suspended financial aid to Honduras.392 Even though this thesis has focused primarily on 
the domestic factors surrounding Zelaya’s ouster, the aforementioned involvement of the 
international community, despite the numerous reactions taken, is noteworthy ultimately 
because of the lack of influence any outside entity had on bringing about a resolution to 
the crisis. No foreign nation, including the United States or Brazil, arguably South 
America’s hegemon, or international organization, including the United Nations and the 
OAS, could bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Perhaps what this crisis says 
to the world is that in political climates, such as Honduras, any effort to bring about a 
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solution to a political crisis surrounding weak institutions and extreme elitism should be 
more from an advisory position rather than a leading role. It is baffling that regional and 
international powers were unable to solve an arguably simple crisis in such a small and 
relatively insignificant country like Honduras. Yet, while the effectiveness of the 
international community’s reaction varied, the domestic response to the crisis was 
arguably far worse. 
After Zelaya’s removal, public upheaval in the form of street protests 
skyrocketed. “Both supporters and opponents of the deposed president regularly took to 
the streets by the thousands.”393 Pérez-Liñán’s social protest causal factor had finally 
materialized. The increase in protests caused violent clashes with police and military 
authorities trying to maintain order. “Amnesty International reported that the use of 
excessive force by the army and police resulted in hundreds of beatings and detentions as 
well as several deaths.”394 Domestic economics took a major hit in the aftermath of the 
coup as “investment and tourism came to a halt, and more than 180,000 Hondurans lost 
their jobs.”395 Zelaya never wavered in his attempt to return to power; he tried multiple 
times to reenter the country and finally found refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in 
Tegucigalpa. From there, Zelaya “began to direct his movement” to return to power but 
“he was unable to rally enough new supporters to force Micheletti out.”396 Costa Rican 
President Oscar Arias was summoned to try to negotiate a settlement to the crisis between 
Zelaya and Micheletti but his efforts ultimately failed. As a result, “the United States 
stepped up pressure on Micheletti by suspending virtually all nonhumanitarian aid and 
canceling the visas of leading members and supporters of the interim government.”397 
Despite numerous attempts at reconciliation, no agreement was ever reached to return 
Zelaya to his post; thus, the regularly scheduled national elections of November 2009 
proceeded on schedule. The election results returned the National Party under the 
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leadership of Porfirio Lobo Sosa to power in both the executive and legislature. The 
election of Lobo Sosa was recognized by the United States and several other nations in 
Latin America, which thus, ended the crisis.  
B. THE CRITICAL EQUATION: REELECTION PLUS THE NEW LEFT 
As Chapter II demonstrated, the central finding of this thesis surrounds the 
necessity of both the attempt at reelection and the influence of the new left to answer the 
removal question. It is important to understand, however, that these elements are two 
separate things altogether: one does not imply the other. It is widely accepted that 
reelection efforts in Latin America began under right-of-center governments in Latin 
America during the 1990s. Since then, many countries have implemented the policy, such 
as Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and of course, Venezuela. Yet, not all countries have 
bought into the idea of reelection as each case is different among the nations that have 
participated. The context of the political atmosphere in each country has determined 
whether or not the people will buy into reelection. Furthermore, while the reelection 
threat was associated with the new left and Chávez in the Honduran case, it is important 
to understand that this trend did not start under leftist governments. Thus, the new left 
does not presume reelection as an element in its definition.  
Most analyses of the Zelaya situation conclude similar to what J. Mark Ruhl 
surmises: 
When President Zelaya shifted sharply to the left and defied the authority 
of the Supreme Court, the TSE, and the National Congress, his opponents 
felt justified in using any means at their disposal against him. Fearing that 
Zelaya sought an unconstitutional second term, they persuaded the armed 
forces to remove the president from the office to which he had been 
democratically elected.398 
This conclusion is not incorrect as these statements summarize the empirical findings of 
this thesis. Yet, the problem with conclusions such as this one is that the link between the 
reelection issue and the new left is missing. While both are separate entities, they both 
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were necessary in the removal equation in Honduras. Chapter II used a comparative 
analysis of the ideologies and desires of numerous former presidents since the return to 
democracy to reveal this finding. Leftist Presidents were not removed solely because of 
their ideology. Similarly, those who at some point had a desire for reelection were also 
not removed. For Honduras, only when both elements occur in the context of the rise of 
the new radical left and ongoing elite power in Honduran politics does removal occur. 
Zelaya was that first president since the return to democracy to exhibit both of the 
aforementioned elements and he was the first leader ousted as a result.  
C. RESPONSE OF INSTITUTIONS TO THE ELITES 
Chapter II clearly demonstrated that the elites control Honduran government and 
politics. This elite coalition against Zelaya included members of the “traditional political 
class and private sector, most of the media, the security forces,” and the leadership of the 
Honduran Roman Catholic Church.399 Zelaya and “Chávez sparked new fears of 
revolution among the nation’s privileged political and economic elites;”400 and, along 
with his threatened reelection attempt, wanted him removed as president. Thus, the 
Honduran governmental institutions responded to these fears and ousted Zelaya. This 
thesis has demonstrated that, unlike the arguments of Taylor-Robinson and Ura, this case 
was not a clash of institutions, but rather, the influence of elites on the actions of 
institutions masquerading as autonomous entities separate from outside power. If this 
were a case of institutional conflict, then arguably, limited evidence of congressional and 
judicial support for any of Zelaya’s policies would exist rather than the large amounts 
presented in this thesis. The chapters in this thesis clearly point to several times when 
each of these institutions not only worked with but also supported many of Zelaya’s 
actions and policies—thus, a purely institutional argument is not sufficient to explain his 
removal. The congress and Supreme Court responded to the fears of the elites, and thus 
facilitated, their desire to remove Zelaya. 
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An important note must be made about the military’s involvement in the situation. 
To begin with, the military was following constitutional orders of the congress and courts 
responding to the sentiments of the elites. Yet, ultimately revealed about the Honduran 
military through the Zelaya case is that the military still had institutional autonomy. The 
military’s anti-leftist hatred and fear of an insurgent uprising motivated its decision to 
expatriate Zelaya—an order not given by either the congress or the courts. The military 
stood out against the backdrop of institutional responses to the wishes of elites and 
demonstrated its autonomy through its decision making. As such, Pion-Berlin and 
Trinkunas’ element of rational decision making in deciding to quarter or not appears to 
have some relevance in this case. The authors note that rational decisions about whether 
to repress, rebel, or quarter are made when “the potential for being held accountable by 
the government [is] greatly discounted relative to the potential for societal or legal 
accountability.”401 This thesis has shown that the Honduran generals were not only 
obeying the law but that they arguably were making a rational decision about potential 
reprisals from the incoming government and even the United States. Furthermore, since 
the military’s previous coups were not punished, given that they maintained significant 
institutional strength after the return to democracy, the military arguably had not reason 
to quarter itself and made the decision to expatriate Zelaya. Thus, the rational decision 
portion of the author’s argument supports the conclusion of the military’s autonomy in 
the situation. 
The Honduran political crisis of 2009 surrounding President Zelaya demonstrates 
potential consequences of political systems governed by elites in a clientilistic matter. 
Moreover, it reveals what can happen when weak institutions are unable to counter the 
desires of the powerful elites. Therefore, other regions of the world that house countries 
that exhibit these aforementioned conditions, such as the Middle East and Africa, should 
focus on strengthening their institutions to the point at which they could withstand elitist 
pressure and function on their own. Arguably, if the Honduran Congress and judiciary 
were stronger at the time of the coup, they would not have reacted the way they did to the 
event. The referendum that Zelaya wanted would not have gone into effect until after the 
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next president was sworn in—his name would not have appeared on the November 2009 
ballot. Any changes to the constitution would have been made after he left office and 
arguably the institutions knew this because Zelaya gave “repeated assurances that he 
would be in office only until the last day of his mandate.”402 Arguably, the military 
would have feared reprisal from strong institutions and might not have illegally 
expatriated Zelaya. Strong institutions would have recognized that Zelaya’s referendum 
was a simple poll and not have allowed an actual binding referendum to occur all the 
while waiting for his term in office to expire; thus, the crisis would have been avoided. 
Counterfactuals aside, this case reveals some of the negative consequences that weak 
institutions can yield in clientilistic and elite political systems. Even so, weak institutions 
are arguably the only way these types of political systems flourish—strong institutions 
can breed strong governments void of significant elite influence. 
The removal of President Zelaya from office was clearly motivated by fears of his 
leftist ideology and alleged attempt at reelection. The legality of the process did not 
matter to the elites who used weak government institutions, along with the illegal 
expatriation actions of the military, to oust a constitutionally elected president. The 
importance of the combination of reelection and the new left is critical to answering the 
removal question as the two elements alone do not provide sufficient evidence. Future 
Honduran leaders would be wise to take note of Zelaya’s actions. A desire to reform the 
constitution to seek reelection is not necessarily a problem in Honduras despite the 
untouchable nature of the institution as the past demonstrates. Furthermore, a radical 
leftist ideology is not necessarily a threat to the elites on its own. Yet, if a future leader 
decides to combine these two elements as Manuel Zelaya did, then perhaps prior to doing 
so, that person should be familiar with the Costa Rican real estate market. 
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